

## REVIEW ARTICLE

### THE REUNION OF THE UKRAINE WITH RUSSIA

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*Vossoyedineniye Ukrainy s Rossiyei, dokumenty i materialy v 3-kh tomakh.* [The Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia, Documents and Material in Three Volumes], Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR i USSR, Moscow 1954.

On the occasion of the Tercentenary of the Pereyaslav Treaty (January 8, 1654), the Academies of Sciences of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR published three volumes of collected historical documents and related material covering the period 1620-1654. This edition was under the scientific-archeographical control of members of the Sources Publication Sector of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, A. A. Novoselski and L. N. Pushkarev and a member of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, F. P. Shevchenko. The collection of material and the composition of all three volumes were carried out by twelve co-workers of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Central Archive of the Ukrainian SSR and by three co-workers of the Archives Administration of the MVD of the Ukrainian SSR (one to each volume).

Volume I is titled: *Ukraina pered osvoboditelnoi voinoi* [Ukraine before the War of Liberation]. This volume contains an introductory article by the editors for the three volumes (pp. V—XXXI), documents for the period 1620-1641 listed under Nos. 1-283, and a list of publications referring to those previously made public, notes on documents, a glossary of old words and expressions, a proper name and geographical index, and a list of the documents in the first volume. In addition there are the following illustrations: (1) Moscow, Red Square. A miniature in color from a manuscript book of 1672. (2) Photographs: a. (p.4) Memorandum of the Moscow Foreign Office concerning the reception of Hetman Sahaydachny's mission in 1620;

b. (p. 91) title page of the book *Gramatiki slovenskiya pravilnoye syntegma* by M. Smotrytsky published in 1619; c. (p. 93) title page of the book *Besidy Ioanna Zlatoustoho*, published in Kiev in 1624; d. (p. 94) title page of the book *Leksikon sloveno-rosski*, published in Kiev in 1627; e. (p. 154) a copy of a letter of 1635 by Khilkov, the *voyevoda* of Bryansk, concerning the erection of an inn and trading post for Ukrainian merchants in Bryansk; f. (between pages 400 and 401) pictures of the Kiev castle on Mount Kisilivka, from a painting by A. v. Westervelt of 1651.

Volume II. *Osvoboditelnaya voyna ukrainskogo naroda i borba za vossoyedineniye s Rossiyei* [War of Liberation of the Ukrainian People and the Struggle for Reunion with Russia, 1648-1651]. This volume contains: (1) Documents and materials listed under Nos. 1-212. (2) Abbreviations and lists of publications, notes on texts of documents, a glossary of old words and expressions, a proper name and geographical index, an index of documents Nos. 1-212. (3) Photographs: a. a letter of Hetman B. Khmelnyts'ky to the tsar, dated August 8, 1648, in his own hand; b. the tsar's writ to the *voyevoda* of Putyvl, Pleshcheyev (p. 165); c. the tsar's writ to B. Khmelnyts'ky (document No. 110); d. insert pages from the following books: *Prolog*, Moscow, 1642; *Yevangeliya*, Moscow, 1644; *Psaltir*, Moscow 1649 (404-6); e. list of documents, Nos. 1-212.

Volume III. *Zaversheniye borby ukrainskogo naroda za vossoyedineniye s Rossiyei. Pereyaslavskaya rada*, (1651-1654) [The Completion of the Ukrainian People's Struggle for Reunion with Russia, the Council of Pereyaslav, 1651-1654]. This volume contains: (1) Documents and material listed under Nos. 1-252. (2) Abbreviations and a list of publications; notes on documents; a glossary of old words and expressions; a proper name and geographical index and a list of documents, Nos. 1-252. (3) Illustrations: a. On the frontispiece a color portrait of B. Khmelnyts'ky. This was copied from an oil portrait by an unknown seventeenth century artist and is from the State Historical Museum in Moscow. On the right side of the portrait there is the inscription: "Zinovei Bohdan Khmelnyts'ky, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host and of Both Banks of the Dnieper." (4) Photographs;

1. letter of I. Shokhov, appointive colonel of Chernihiv to the *voyevoda* of Bryansk, D. Velikogagin, of 1651. 2. B. Khmelnytsky's proclamation in his own hand to the colonels, captains, mayors... concerning issuance to the tsar's envoys of food, horse teams, and a guide of 1651. 3. Photographs of title pages of the following books: *Sluzhebnyk* of the Metropolitan P. Mohyla printed by Kiev-Pecherska Lavra in 1639; *Perlo Mnohotsinnoe* by Kyrylo Trankvilion, Chernihiv, 1646; *Poluustav*, Kiev, 1646. (5) An enlargement on five insert pages of a writ of June 22, 1653 of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich resolving to accept the Zaporozhian Host under the tsar's high hand (document No. 169, pp. 320-321). (6) A photo-engraving, Kiev in 1651, from a painting by A. v. Westervelt (between pp. 368 and 369). (7) A photostat-insert on three pages of the resolution of the *Zemski sobor* of October 1, 1653 to accept the Zaporozhian Host under the tsar's high hand. (8) A photo-engraving between pages 464 and 465: a view of Moscow and the Kremlin from Red Square. Painting from Meyerberg's album of 1661-1662. (9) A photostat of the first page of the articles of B. Khmelnytsky, eleven in number, of March 27, 1654 (p. 562). (10) A photostat of impression of state seal used in communications with the Zaporozhian Host. (11) A separate sheet with a geographical map of the Ukraine after the Treaty of 1654. In addition the collection contains a few photostats of seventeenth century documents. It is unfortunate that there is no indication of the size of the originals from which photostatic copies were made.

The three volumes of this publication contain 747 documents and materials which pertain to the brief period of thirty-five years (1620-1654). Of these, 276 documents had been published previously in various Russian, Ukrainian and Polish publications; the remaining 471 documents have now been published for the first time. Most of them were taken from the Central Archive of Ancient Acts (*Tsentralny arkhiv drevnikh aktov*—Ts. A. D. A.) of the USSR, the funds of the following chanceries: Foreign, Military, Little Russian, Polish, Siberian. Funds of the Central State Historical Archive (Ts. D. I. A.) of the Ukrainian SSR provided some documents from record books of the Volo-

dymyr county and city court and the Zhytomir city court. Some documents were taken from the Kharkiv branch of this archive and one document from the record book of the Kiev city court, which is at present under the care of the Lviv branch of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR in its manuscript collection *Ossolineum*. All the documents relate to the territory of the Left-Bank Ukraine.

In addition to these, some documents have found their way into the collection relating to the territory and population of West Ukraine and even Carpathian Ukraine. They have been taken from the funds of the Lviv branch of the Central State Historical Archive of the Ukrainian SSR (a name which made its appearance after the annexation of West and Carpatho-Ukraine in 1945) and are from the record books of the city courts of Lviv, Syanik, Terebovla and Peremysl and the record book of city hall of Lviv. One document has been taken from the fund of the Transcarpathian Provincial State Archive, a decree of the Austrian Emperor of 1643. These lands were not, however, contracting parties in 1654 and had no relation to the acts concluded in 1654, and, therefore, the publication of these documents in the collection dedicated to "the reunion" of the Ukraine with Russia in 1654 is unwarranted.

Despite the very large number of documents and material in this collection, one cannot say that this three volume work is complete. It lacks many documents which the editors and their co-workers did not find but which are referred to in the published documents. Those documents which could not be found are noted in footnotes by the term, "document undisclosed." In the footnotes to the third volume there are seventy-one such undisclosed documents. There are also lacking some very important documents relating to the period of negotiations immediately before the conclusion of the Treaty of 1654, and, in particular: (a) a draft of the treaty containing twenty-three articles and written by Hetman B. Khmelnyts'ky and his staff in Chyhyryn on February 17, 1654 with the tsar's decrees; (b) the minutes of negotiations of envoys S. Bohdanovych and P. Teterya with the *dumnyie* boyars in Moscow on March 13, 1654; (c) the en-

voys' request for pay for the Cossacks; and (d) the request for permission for the Ukrainian mission to leave. These documents were published in volume X of *Akty Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (AYuZR). Some of them, for example, the treaty draft containing twenty-three articles and the minutes of negotiations with the boyars of March 13, 1654, are of prime importance in explaining the Treaty of 1654. Also missing are some minutes of the negotiations of the boyars with B. Khmelnyts'ky's envoys which, as it appears from the course of these negotiations, must have been recorded, but which G. Karpov, the editor of volume X of the AYuZR, could not find. It seems that the editors of this three volume collection did not attempt to find these documents.

Now let us consider this publication from its external archeographic standpoint. The introductory article (pp. XXXI-XXXII) states that "scientific-archeographical" control of the publication was entrusted to two editors representing the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and one representing the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. It further provides a detailed explanation of the rules of "Soviet scientific archeographical publication of old archival documents" governing editors and their assistants in preparing selected documents for publication. We read there that *Muscovite* archival documents are printed in the collection in the language of the original but in *modern Soviet transcription*. Documents in the *Polish language* are printed in *modern Polish transcription* with a Russian translation. Documents in *Latin* are also printed in the original with a Russian translation. The editors explain that those archival documents written in the "*Ukrainian language common to written documents of the seventeenth century*" have thus far no *fixed rules for their publication*. However, "applying the basic rules concerning publication of documents of the State Archive Fund of the USSR" and the "wealth of experience of Soviet archeography," the editors of this collection have made the "first attempt" to give the seventeenth century Ukrainian documents in *modern Ukrainian transcription*, retaining, however, the peculiarities of the Ukrainian language of the period. And the

editors have taken into account the fact that this publication is aimed not at *specialists and philologists* but at *broad circles of readers*. The original text of the Ukrainian documents has been printed in "modern Ukrainian transcription." No Russian translation has been added to them, but at the conclusion of each volume there are separate glossaries of "difficult words and expressions." In applying a modern transcription to seventeenth century Ukrainian documents, the editors, as was stated in the introductory article, have made the following changes in the transliteration of the old Ukrainian documentary transcription: they have discarded the letter "Ѣ" in all cases where it has lost "all meaning," excepting words in which an apostrophe (') is substituted for this letter. As a rule, in Ukrainian documents of the seventeenth century, the letter "Ѣ" was pronounced as "i"; therefore, the letter "i" is used in this collection. Letters which are no longer used have been changed for the corresponding symbols of the modern Ukrainian alphabet: "н" to "i," "ы" to "и," double "о" to single "o," "ѳ" to "ф," "ѣ" to "е," "х" (Latin) to "кc." The Latin letters "n" and "g," if they occur in documents, have been changed to the Ukrainian "н" and "г." The explanation does not state, however, that modern Ukrainian transcription does not have just one letter "i" but three: the hard "н," the soft "i," and the iotacised "ї"; not one letter "r" as in Russian but two: the soft "r" which is pronounced like the Anglo-American "h" and the hard "r" or "g" which is pronounced like "kg"; not one "e" as in Russian but two: the short and hard "е" and the long iotacised "є."

It is not stated whether the editors have used such letters in the texts of Ukrainian documents, but in reading these documents in the new transcription of the editors, a state of complete chaos is apparent. In addition to the changes mentioned, the original texts of the Ukrainian documents have been further altered as have the other documents. Some of these alterations are indicated by quotation marks, but "*obvious errors in the text of documents have been corrected without explanation,*" which means that future students of documents published in the collection will not be sure in some instances whether this or that

word or even a whole sentence is as it was in the original or a creation of the collection's editors.

Another interesting innovation of this publication is the fact that all words relating to religion—capitalized in the originals (Boh, Hospod', Isus Khrystos, Bozha Maty, names of feasts, etc.)—are now in lower case letters. This seems to be a tribute to "Bolshevik godlessness." In the tsar's writs and the diplomatic documents, the full title of the Muscovite tsars and Polish kings has been omitted: there is only a note that the original text included the full title (e. g., P. T.—*polny titul*). This has created additional difficulties for researchers, since, as is known, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich used the "incorrect writing of the tsar's title in Polish documents, which demeaned the tsar's honor, and the superfluous additions to the titles of the Polish king," as a pretext for the declaration of war. It would have been better to give the full title of the tsar and the king in the Muscovite and Polish documents and to indicate where subsequent changes occurred, because it was precisely in this period that such changes took place.

The documents in the collection are numbered consecutively; the name of each document is given before the text (writ, letter, list of articles, etc.) and a short summary of the document follows. The name of the fund where the document was found and the name of the publication (if it had been previously published) is given beneath the text.

On the basis of the external description of the published documents and the method and rules which governed the editors of the collection, this publication cannot be recognized as a scientific-archeographic publication of seventeenth century archival documents, and this in spite of the fact that the introduction mentions "scientific-archeographic rules" and "wealth of experience of Soviet archeography." The very same editors admit that the publication is not destined for "specialists and philologists" but for the "broad circle of readers." In Soviet language this means that the purpose of the collection of archival documents, relating to the mutual attitudes of the Ukraine and Moscow over a period of thirty-five years and the conclusion of a treaty

between Hetman B. Khmelnyts'ky and the Muscovite tsar in 1654, is straight Soviet propaganda, and not an answer to a demand of free scientific research. This explains why the documents have been published in a *sui generis* manner and without adherence to standard scholarly rules, not to mention archeographic rules.

The documents contained in this collection, especially those published for the first time, will be read and studied primarily by students of history and law. It is of great importance for them whether the published documents are an *accurate rendition of the authentic text*. Will these documents—printed in a “new Soviet transcription” and with textual changes made for extraneous reason entirely unrelated to science—inspire their confidence? This observation is particularly applicable to the Ukrainian documents since their original text was most altered. In addition to the changes in words of a religious meaning and the omission of additions in the original texts, the “modern Ukrainian transcription” used in the collection and the substitution of letters have been so ineptly executed and with so many errors that they have changed the good Ukrainian language, in which almost all the originals of the Ukrainian documents were written, beyond recognition. It is quite apparent that the person who prepared the texts of these documents for publication had not mastered the Ukrainian language and frequently “Muscovized” Ukrainian words. During the course of manipulating the text of the Ukrainian documents, fundamental errors might have occurred, and, as a result, researchers will not have complete confidence in the published documents.

The editors have reckoned very little with works published by previous researchers and editors of documents pertaining to the Treaty of 1654. Thus, in some instances, they have compounded errors committed previously but subsequently corrected. For example, they have included in the preamble to the text of the so-called “Articles of B. Khmelnyts'ky” (Vol. III, Document No. 245) the date: in the year 162, March 12. G. Karpov, who was the editor of Vol. X, *AYuZR*, which included documents of the Treaty of 1654, stated that the date “March 12” in the origi-



nal was placed in an "erased spot" (this spot is even now visible on the photostat of this document contained in this collection, (Vol. III, p. 562). Karpov, relying on the antiquated *Istoriya Malorossii* by Markevych (Vol. III, pp. 146-154), changed the date to "March 21." The editors of this collection inserted this date in the title of this documents; now there are two dates in the collection: March 21 in the title and March 12 in the text. Both dates have been rejected by other researchers. They base their rejection on the fact that Khmelnyts'ky's envoys met the *dumnyie* boyars for the first time on March 13 and that, as attested by this document, it had not been drafted by the envoys, but by councilors in the Foreign Office. Another example: page 569 shows the imprint of the tsar's seal "for writs to the Zaporozhian Host of the time of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich." It has been proved (V. Prokopovych, *Sfragistychni anekdoty* [Sphragistic anecdotes], Prague, 1938) that this seal is inapplicable to the tsar's writs of 1654 because it was only made in 1667.

Propaganda of the so-called "Reunion of the Ukrainian People with the Brotherly Russian People"—the object of the publication of this three volume collection—becomes particularly clear when we consider the *internal contents* of documents published in the collection. The introductory article contains a short description of the collected documents alluding to their contents and historical meaning.

It states: "In the first volume there are documents which illustrate events on the eve of the Ukraine's struggle for liberation from 1620 to 1647. The year 1620 has been taken as the starting point, for then, the Zaporozhian Host *in a letter to the Muscovite government, showed a desire to serve Russia*. But if we turn to the text of this document, we find that *there was no letter from the Zaporozhian Host to the Muscovite government at all* and that the Cossack mission, headed by Petro Odynets', was received by the tsar's boyars. They "orally declared their service" and their "wish to serve him, their great sovereign, as of old with their heads, just as they had served former Russian sovereigns...." Whether the Zaporozhian mission had declared its desire to serve the tsar by such statements, is not certain. It can

only be said that this was what was recorded in the documents of the Foreign Office. The introductory article transformed this document of the Foreign Office into "a letter of the Zaporozhian Host." Thus, the very first document in the collection reveals the manner of preparation of the documents.

The introductory article further states that the first volume has "introduced into scientific circulation new and interesting documents concerning the hard economic conditions in Ukraine on the eve of the fight for liberation, the cruel regime of the Polish gentry, the feudal-serf oppression of Ukraine's peasants, workers, etc., the Cossack rebellion of the 1630's and the social composition of the ranks of the rebels of 1635, headed by Sulyma." The majority of documents in this volume purport to characterize "Ukrainian-Russian ties" on the eve of the liberation struggle. This is to serve as the basis for the study of the little-known problem of Russia's commercial and economic relations with the Ukraine, as well as cultural ties between the two people and Russian Cossack military aid. The introduction assures the reader that he will find a large number of documents pertaining to the economic and cultural ties between the Ukraine and Russia (i. e. Muscovy, since Russia did not exist at that time). Additional new documents are included concerning the "aid" of the Russian people to the Ukrainian people, in particular, documents concerning the "direct participation" of the Russian people in the fight against the army of the Polish gentry; concerning Russia's aid to the Ukraine "in grain, salt, arms, gunpowder, lead" and also their "impressive diplomatic aid" especially "in negotiations with the Polish government in defense of the Ukraine's interests." Finally, the introduction emphasizes that this publication contains a large number of new documents concerning the settlement of Ukrainians within the borders of the Muscovite state and their intent to remain there for life, and also documents which *characterize the warm desire of the Ukrainian people to unite forever with the Great Russian people.*

After checking the documents referred to in the introductory article, I have found that these documents do not justify the allegations of the introduction and, sometimes, contain informa-

tion directly contradictory. In addition, I have read a large number of documents, which were not quoted in the introductory article probably because they contain information contradicting the conclusions of the introduction. Space prevents my referring to all documents which I have read; I will, however, cite the most important and mention the others.

I have already referred to the document in Vol. I, No. 1, dated 1620. The editors have titled this document "A letter from the Zaporozhian Host to the Muscovite government concerning the Cossacks' desire to serve Russia." Its text indicates that it is not a letter from the Zaporozhian Host, but a memorandum, drafted in the office of the Moscow Foreign Office. The councilors of the Foreign Office have recorded the desire of the Cossacks to serve the tsar from "the words of P. Odynets'." Document No. 8, Vol. I, is described thus: 1621. Memorandum of the *voyevody* of Putyvl, V. Turenin and S. Sobakin, with news of the annihilation of the Turkish Army by the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Polish Army near the city of Khotin.... And in the document we read: "where the Turkish (the sultan's) people defeated the Lithuanian people." In the footnote to these words there is the following explanation: "This refers obviously to the battle of the Polish Army with the Turks near Jassy on April 17, 1621." Thus the battle was not near Khotin but near Jassy, and it was not the Cossacks and Poles who beat the Turkish people, but the Turks who beat the Polish-Cossack Army. Volume III, No. 91, a document of 1652, is titled: "Inquiry report to the Foreign Office of the merchant Zerkalnikov who had been to see B. Khmelnyts'ky concerning the situation in the Ukraine and the general desire of the Ukrainian people for reunion with Russia...." This merchant had been to Chyhyryn and had seen Secretary General I. Vyhovsky. The latter told him a lot of "secret information" and, among other things, had said the following: "If, let us say, His Imperial Majesty will not consent to take the Hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Host under his ruling hand today, then, let God be the judge, they will not be subject to any ruler." Vyhovsky's words far from prove the "general desire of the Ukrainian people for reunion with Russia." Document No. 101, Vol. III, is

from 1651 and titled: "Register in the Foreign Office—the negotiations with B. Khmelnyts'ky's envoy, I. Iskra, concerning the reunion of the Ukraine with Russia." This is what the text of the document says on the subject of this "reunion": In reply to the councilors' question, "If the Poles begin to press the Cherkassy very hard, will not B. Khmelnyts'ky and the entire Zaporozhian Host go over to the Crimean Khan?" Iskra replied to this: "If the Zaporozhian Host is hard pressed by the Poles, they have nobody else to turn to but His Imperial Majesty." The councilors observed that B. Khmelnyts'ky and the Zaporozhian Host were doing well in refusing to join the Moslems. Further the councilors began to convince Iskra that the tsar, for the sake of the Orthodox faith, "feels very kindly disposed towards them." And if the Poles exerted some real "pressure" then "the Hetman and the Cherkassy would go toward His Majesty." "And in the Muscovite tsardom," they continued, "there is much land, wide and bountiful, and they would have room to settle." They should only move farther from the border to the Don or Medvedytsya; it will be better so and there would be no "dispute." Thus councilors continued their propaganda calling for the emigration from the Ukraine to the Muscovite kingdom. And it is this propaganda which the editors have termed the "negotiations for reunion of the Ukraine with Russia." Similar errors in the titles of documents can be found in many other instances (Vol. III, Nos. 153, 176, 183, 184, 185, 186 and others) and these errors increase by 1653, the last year before the Pereyaslav Rada. Three large volumes with a few hundred documents will not encourage the average reader to become more familiar with the text. To get some idea of the documents, he will read the index of documents placed at the end of each volume and will discover the great number of documents on "the reunion of the Ukrainian people with the brotherly Russian people." This is what the editors of the collection obviously had in mind when they gave titles to documents which do not correspond to the respective texts but do contribute to the propaganda of "reunion." It behooves us to note here that the documents published in this collection did not, and could not, contain such expressions as, the "reunion of

the Ukrainian people with the Russian people" or the "reunion of the Ukraine with Russia." The documents of this period merely stated that "the tsar should take B. Khmelnyts'ky and the Zaporozhian Host under his high hand," and it was thought for a long time that this would be the same as the migration of the Ukrainian population to the territory of the Muscovite kingdom.

The Muscovite envoys, their agents, and spies conducted intensive propaganda for the resettlement of Ukrainians, praising the lands of Muscovy, the good life there, and extolling Aleksei Mikhailovich, the tsar of Muscovy.

In Vol. II, Nos. 117, 118, 173 and 181 there is evidence of how the Muscovite envoys extolled their tsar. The first is an order from the Foreign Office to Grigori Neronov, the tsar's envoy to Khmelnyts'ky in 1649; the second document is a report of Neronov from the same year. In the order of the Foreign Office we find the following:

"On the road, if the Hetman, or officers, or officials or anyone else should ask him, Grigori, about the age and appearance of the Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich of all Russia, he should say that our great ruler, His Imperial Majesty, the Tsar, is today twenty years of age, and in his stature, mind, beauty of visage, and kindness of nature and in all the fine honors, the Almighty God [as in the text] has more endowed him, our great sovereign [short title of the tsar] than any other person. And unto all people, his subjects and foreigners, His Imperial Majesty is kind and generous; in his sovereign mercy he contemplates all and, according to his sovereign judgment, bestows dignities and honors, to each according to his merit. And he is generous to all; no one, after seeing the tsar's illustrious person, departs in sorrow. And he, the great sovereign, is versed in the many wondrous philosophical sciences and in military affairs, and in the military learning of knighthood he has shown great zeal, according to his sovereign rank and dignity. And because of the ruler's discerning mind and courage and kind nature, he, our great sovereign, is worthy of subjugating many other powers and states. And to him, the great sovereign, His Imperial Majesty, God has given a son and to all of us a ruler and truly

faithful crown prince, the Grand Prince Dmitri Alekseyevich, and to all of us, subjects of His Imperial Majesty, gladness and great rejoicing.”

In the report of envoy Neronov (Doc. No. 118) there is a literal transcription of all that he had been ordered to say about the tsar. The only change was that the speech about the tsar was delivered by the envoy to Khmelnyts'ky personally, and the latter was to have said allegedly that he had heard from many people that “our common sovereign of the Orthodox Christian faith, His Imperial Majesty, had knights for hunting and a military escort which he pays very well.” The veracity of the reports of the Muscovite envoys has long been suspect in historiography, but in this case we also have the tsar's order to the envoy Neronov which proves that the “extolling of the tsar” had been composed in Moscow for the obvious purpose of being used as propaganda in the Ukraine. The next year the tsar sent Vasili Unkovski as the envoy to B. Khmelnyts'ky. In the order to this envoy (Doc. No. 173) and in the report of this envoy (No. 181) there is the same “extolling of the tsar” as in the documents of the envoy Neronov.

The introductory article calls the reader's attention to the fact that Vols. II and III contain a large number of documents on the *economic and cultural ties between the Ukraine and Russia* from the period of the war of liberation, i. e., new documents relating to the aid of the Muscovite people to the Ukrainian people. These were: a. documents concerning the direct participation “of the Russian population in the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the armies of the Polish gentry; b. documents concerning Moscow's aid to Ukraine with “grain, salt, arms, gunpowder, lead”; c. material on the resettlement of Ukrainians within the borders of Russia, etc.; and d. documents concerning the “impressive diplomatic aid expressed in negotiations with the Polish government in defense of the Ukraine's interests.”

(a) *Direct participation of the Muscovite population in the Ukraine's fight with Poland.* The documents published in the collection do not confirm such participation of the Muscovite

population, at least, not to the extent that merits mention. Two or three documents note that two "sons of boyars" ran away from their parents to the Ukraine, and there they "Cossacked" for some time and then returned home. The parents had a lot of trouble because they had to go to Moscow and ask the tsar to forgive the irresponsibility of their sons. Such "Cossacking" was prohibited by the Muscovite government and such escapees were called traitors in the documents (Vol. II, Nos. 86, 120; Vol. I, No. 8 of 1621: *Ondroska putivlets*, 'traitor'). As far as the "Don Cossacks" are concerned, Vol. I No. 26 contains a 1625 report of the governors of Sevsk in which, according to the words of Ukrainian refugees from Novhorod-Siversk, "the Zaporozhian and Lithuanian Cherkassy are calling free people and Don Cossacks to Zaporizhzhya to help them." Document No. 21 (Vol. II, year 1648) states that a boyar's son, Chumikov, had told the tsar's governor in V'yazma that he had heard from a Mohyliv merchant, Vygolkin, who in turn had heard from other Mohyliv merchants, that there were supposed to be in the Cossack forces, Tatars and "the Sovereign's people—Cossacks." The source of this information is so unreliable as to be worthless. The authors of the introduction themselves felt that the information furnished by this document was unreliable; therefore in footnote forty-four, they refer to a "Memo of the Pole, M. Holynski" and to documents of the Office of Military Affairs, which for some reason have not been made public in this collection. As a result of the continuing friendly relations between the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks and their mutual aid in fighting the Tatars, it may be assumed that the forces of B. Khmelnytsky occasionally contained some detachments of Don Cossacks. But Don Cossacks are not a "Muscovite population." Thus a careful check of the document does not confirm the allegation contained in the introductory article concerning the "direct participation of the Muscovite population in the Ukraine's fight with Poland" except for the above-mentioned cases of temporary participation of a few youths who had been lured by "Cossacking" and not by any wish to aid the "Cherkassy."

(b) *Moscow's aid to the Ukraine with grain, salt, arms, gunpowder, lead.* There are no documents in the collection supporting the allegation of such aid. The Ukrainian forces did not need such aid because they had all these commodities. Document No. 138 of 1650 (Vol. II) states that "in Cherkassian cities they make gunpowder and haul it in barrels to B. Khmelnyts'ky," and No. 226 of 1644 (Vol. I) states that Ukrainian merchants carried gunpowder and lead to the Don for sale. It is also well known that the mining of saltpeter, an important ingredient in the manufacture of gunpowder, was widespread in the Ukraine and that the tsar had summoned Ukrainian experts in mining saltpeter. The editor's footnote to document No. 182 (Vol. I) states that Ukrainian experts prepared saltpeter for the Muscovite kingdom in Putyvl county (for the years 1630 and 1638), in Bohorodsk and Voronizh (1639), Volnovsk (1645), Kursk (1637), and in other counties. Documents of the Office of Military Affairs and the Foreign Office are cited but not included in the collection. The statement made in the introduction that Moscow helped the Ukraine with gunpowder and lead was the result of an erroneous interpretation of document No. 161 of 1650 (Vol. II), which is titled "The humble petition of Ukrainians of the city of Koroch to the Office of Military Affairs for the delivery of gunpowder and lead." It is evident from the document that these were Ukrainian refugees who had settled "forever" in the Muscovite kingdom and were paid by the tsar for their services. Moscow had deducted four *altina* each from their pay for "gunpowder and lead" purchased in Moscow, but they had not received the gunpowder and lead which they had purchased. Now they were asking the tsar to have their purchase sent to them and this was done. Some documents mention the delivery of arms to Ukrainians, but these were also refugees from the Ukraine, who in the tsarist service guarded the southern border against Tatar attacks.

The categorical statement in the introduction concerning "aid to the Ukrainian population in grain and salt" requires explanation. In reading this statement one might think that the tsarist government helped the Ukraine by sending loads of



grain and salt at tsarist expense to the Ukrainian forces and population. This would have been a significant contribution to the Ukraine, which was at war with Poland for several years and, therefore, unable to produce a sufficient quantity of grain. Some documents note that there was a famine in the Ukraine in 1638 (Vol. I, No. 142) and that in 1650 the harvest was below par (Vol. II, No. 134). But the documents in this collection do not mention aid in grain and salt to the Ukraine. They contain the tsarist decrees to the *voyevody* of border cities which grant permission to the Ukrainian population to purchase grain and salt *in border cities with their own money and to transport it to the Ukraine*; similarly, the Muscovite population was permitted to export grain for sale in Ukrainian cities and villages. Of course, this was aid but of a type which did not burden the tsarist's treasury; on the contrary it created a profit. Some documents also contain the prescriptions and restrictions with regard to quantity and place which were imposed upon the sale of grain, e. g., No. 130 of 1649 (Vol. II) prohibits the purchase and export of grain abroad by wagon from Putyvl, Rylsk, Sevsk, and Bryansk; only small quantities were permitted to be sold by the "quarter, eighth or sixteenths." A document of 1648, No. 65, contains a petition of the *voyevoda* of Khotin to the tsar asking that Khotin merchants be forbidden to send grain abroad, because the local population is "impoverished"; another of 1650, No. 131, prohibits the sale of grain to the Ukrainians; No. 134 of 1650 contains an order to the *voyevoda* of V'yasma which prohibited the export of grain, because Muscovite grain, which was brought to the Ukraine, was sold at exorbitant prices as a result of the poor crops; No. 192 of the same year contains a permission to export grain to the Ukraine. In the majority of cases the permission or proscription of purchase and sale of grain and its exportation to the Ukraine depended not upon the Ukrainian food supply but upon Moscow's trade policy. Therefore, the problem of the grain (and salt) trade and the export of these commodities must be treated from this angle. The documents cited do not mention *aid in grain or salt* but only *trade* in these commodities of consumption. It must be added that the tsarist treasury levied

all kinds of taxes and export duties upon grain or salt which was sold or exported, Vol. I, Nos. 268 and 269, for the years 1646-1647. During the armed conflict between the Ukraine and Poland, the Muscovite merchants, by taking advantage of the Ukrainian shortage, made good profits on grain. The Ukrainian people, suffering from poor harvests and famine, was compelled to pay the exorbitant prices of the Muscovite speculators. It is true that permission for the sale of grain to Ukrainians had to be given by the tsar, but this did not cost him anything and still the Ukrainian people thanked him for it.

The documents mention little or nothing about other forms of trade between the Ukraine and Muscovy. And when mention is made of them, it is mostly in connection with "trading people of Muscovy" whom the tsarist chanceries or the *voyevody* of border provinces had sent to the Ukraine "to gather secret information," i. e., on espionage missions. This type of "commercial relations" was practiced frequently by Moscow and will be discussed later.

(c) In addition to the economic ties, the introductory article also mentions *cultural* ties between the Ukraine and Muscovy. Documents published in this collection contain little information on these ties. However, these must be divided into those in the realm of *spiritual* and those in the realm of *material* culture. In regard to the former, they pertain mostly to religious and church matters. For example, No. 23, (Vol. I of 1624 reports that Kiev Metropolitan Iov Boretsky sent the monk and priest Pamva Berynda, a well-known Ukrainian scholar, to Moscow to "edit church books" at the tsar's request. In 1630 the tsar asked that the church books, which had been printed in Kiev, be sent to Moscow. These books were sent to him (the title pages have been added to pages 93-4 of Vol. I). In 1640 the monks of the Brethren of the Kiev Monastery asked the tsar to send them icons, vestments, and church books, because the monastery had been robbed by the Poles. In 1649, the tsar asked the Metropolitan of Kiev, S. Kosov, to send the monks Arseniy Satanovsky and Damaskyn Plyts'ky, both scholars, to Moscow to translate the Bible from the Greek into Slavic (No. 80, Vol. II). In the same

year the Metropolitan also sent, in addition to these two monks, the monk Theodosius, a teacher and preacher of the Holy Gospel. A document of the same year (No. 109) mentions earlier Moscow contacts with P. Mohyla, Metropolitan of Kiev: In 1640 the Metropolitan sent a wooden cross with a carving containing a relic of the Grand Prince Volodymyr the Saint which had been found earlier in a silver chalice, to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich. In 1644 P. Mohyla again sent to the tsar church books, (*Besidy Apostoliv* and *Diyniia Apostoliv z Apokalipsom*), a clock "with an alarm and a small breviary"; the monk Ilarion personally carried his own gift, *Poluustav pechatny*. Again in 1646 the Metropolitan sent to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich through Ilinarkh, Prior of the Pechersky Monastery, myrrh, an Arabian horse and two rugs embroidered with gold and silver. In his own name, Ilinarkh presented to the tsar the books *Triod tsvitnu v lytsyakh* and *Akafisty v lytsyakh* (both illustrated). In exchange the tsar presented Metropolitan P. Mohyla two icons with frames of wrought silver. In 1649, at the tsar's request, Metropolitan S. Kosov sent two teacher-monks to Moscow for service. Document No. 111 (Vol. III) 1652 states that Arseniy Satanovsky, whom the tsar had summoned to translate the Greek Bible, brought to Moscow and translated on the tsar's orders a Latin book *O Grode tsarytsi*, the sermons of a certain teacher Meffreth (this was *Sermones Meffreth allios Hortulus Reginae*, published in Nuremberg in 1466). The same document further mentions translators, copyists, and singers who had been brought to Moscow from Ukraine; documents 126 and 127 (Vol. III, year 1652) mention *snytser* (woodcarver), the aged Antonyi, a *snytser*, old Filip, the icon painter Varlaam of the Kiev-Pecherska Lavra; the nuns Tavifa and Marfa of the Kutensky Monastery who had been invited to temporary service in Moscow. To remunerate these Ukrainian clergy for their services, the tsar sent or delivered through messengers the "Tsar's favor" in the form of sable or cash.

In the realm of *material* culture, Ukrainian contacts with Moscow largely took the form of Ukrainian aid to Moscow through the dispatch of various experts and artisans who were in great demand in Moscow. Thus, these documents mention

the dispatch to Moscow at the tsar's request: "smelters, chimney workers, burners of charcoal, coopers, wheelwrights, tinsmiths, *prudnyky* (those who worked on ponds), those who boiled salt-peter (No. 58 of the year 1631, Vol. I), millers (No. 216 of 1642, Vol. I), blacksmiths and cartwrights (No. 216 1642 and Nos. 226-7, 1644, Vol. I ), etc.

Such were the Ukrainian ties with Moscow during the thirty-five year period of the first half of the seventeenth century in the realm of *culture and economics*. Of course, during the war with Poland, the Ukraine was weakened economically and could not compete with Muscovy in the economic field, e. g., in the field of trade. The Ukraine was wealthy, however, in experts and artisans, and that Moscow was deficient in this respect proves the superiority of the Ukrainian standard of living. And in respect to their spiritual culture, the Ukraine of that period was far ahead of Muscovy.

(d) The collection contains many documents on the subject of Ukrainian refugees or "newly-arrived Cherkassy" as they are called, which covered the rules governing their reception by Muscovite officials, the cities in which they were to settle, and the conditions of their life. The rebellion of Cossacks and peasants against the oppression of the Polish government and Polish magnates, which began towards the end of the sixteenth century and continued with varying success until the general uprising of the Ukrainian people under the leadership of Hetman B. Khmelnyts'ky and the subsequent war of all the Ukraine against Poland, adversely effected the Ukrainian population and the national economy. As a rule the area of rebellion and battle with the Polish Army was the Right-Bank Ukraine; the unsuccessful rebels used to withdraw to the Left-Bank. When the Poles, in pursuit of the retreating insurgents, also crossed to the Left-Bank, then the defeated rebel units had no other alternative but to cross the border into the Muscovite territory. The populace followed the Cossacks regardless of whether it participated in the rebellion or not, because the Polish magnates, the owners of latifundia on the Left-Bank, followed the troops and wrought vengeance through their own armed bands. At first the tsarist

government refused to admit the Ukrainian refugees into their territory in order that the "Lithuanians and Cherkassy should not cause harm" (note to No. 72, footnote 92, Vol. I). In No. 135, year 1638, Vol. I, we find that the tsar issued an order in 1636 to the *voyevody* of border provinces which prohibited the acceptance of large Ukrainian refugee groups (50, 100, and 200) because the tsar had concluded a peace with the Polish king (*Polyanovski mir*) in 1634; therefore, these larger groups of Ukrainian refugees could not be accepted for fear of misunderstandings with the Polish king, but smaller groups (2, 5, and 10) might be permitted. But document No. 136 of the same year contains a report that the tsar had given permission to accept a unit of 4,000 "Cherkassy" who had come to Belgorod and wished to settle in the "New town of Krasne on the Koroch." The tsar ordered that they be registered as *streltsy*, Cossacks, and cannoneers, and be paid wages and watched so that they build homesteads and work the fields (Doc. No. 136 of 1638, Vol. I). During the same year Hetman Ostryanytsya suffered a defeat on the Left-Bank and had to cross the Muscovite border with several thousand unregistered Cossacks. The *voyevody* of the border provinces led Ostryanytsya's detachment to the hamlet of Chuhu-yeve, where Ostryanytsya founded the city of Chuhuyiv. This marked the beginning of an uninterrupted stream of Ukrainian refugees to the Muscovite territory, where they settled first in the south and then farther north. The documents mention the following localities which were settled by Ukrainian refugees: Putivl, the *volost'* of Komarnytsya, Kursk, Yelets, Cherny, Livny, Kromy, Novosellye, Ostoroh, Userdye, Valuiki, Voronizh and Voronizh county, Korocha, Korotoyak, Kozlov, the Don province, Kolomna, Pronsk, Shapka, Orel, Kaluga, cities on the Volga, and others. During this period the so-called Slobids'ka Ukraine was settled. Moscow instituted the following formalities for the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees: They were given the official name of "foreigners, newly-arrived Cherkassy" (Vol. I, No. 193); then the Muscovite *voyevody* of border provinces demanded that the refugees declare that they had come "in the tsar's name, for perpetual life"; finally, the refugees had to swear an oath as sub-

jects of the tsar. The *voyevody* had them entered in registers, designated their place of settlement, issued the tsar's "permission to settle," endowed them with fields, garden land and sometimes even gave them money, lumber, etc. for the construction of homesteads; and when they ordered them into any type of service, they would receive an annual compensation. Those refugees who refused to apply "in the tsar's name, for perpetual life," would not be accepted but would be expelled beyond the border (Nos. 89, 90 of 1652, Vol. III). When the refugees had finally settled there were instances of abuses on the part of *voyevody*, the officials, and the Muscovite population, e. g., robbing of the refugees' property, attempts to force them into serfdom, etc. (Nos. 166, 167, 174, Vol. I). Some documents pertaining to these refugees were published by Academician D. Bahaliy in *Materialy dlya istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva* [Materials on the History of Colonization and the Life of the Borderlands of the Muscovite State] Kharkiv, 1886, but the majority of the documents are published here for the first time and they require a detailed study. Of course, future researchers will take notice of the role of official Muscovite propaganda in the matter of the settlement of Ukrainian refugees on Muscovite territory, the outward sign of which was the so-called "tsar's grant to depart" and the benefits derived from the thousands of Ukrainian refugees.

(e) The introductory article states that documents in the collection attest to the "impressive diplomatic aid" of the Muscovite government to the Ukraine when the tsar's envoys carried out negotiations with the Polish government "in defense of her [the Ukraine's] interests." After studying the documents cited in the article, this statement does not appear to be adequately supported. Thus, the first document referred to in the article contains the tsar's decree to the envoy Unkovski. It states that Unkovski should convince B. Khmelnyts'ky to send his own envoys to the Lords of the Polish Crown Council with the proposition that they elect Aleksei Mikhailovich, the Muscovite Tsar, to replace the late King Wladyslaw, because allegedly the "Zaporozhian Host would have an Orthodox king and everyone would

then be will off." B. Khmelnyts'ky refused to send his envoys and gave as his reason the fact that the Poles would not listen to them (No. 59 of 1649, Vol. II). Another document of 1650 (the tsar's order to envoys G. and S. Pushkin, who were sent to Warsaw), stated that should the Poles complain because the tsar had sent his envoys to subjects of the Polish king, i. e., B. Khmelnyts'ky and the Zaporozhian Host, and had urged them to be incorporated in his kingdom, then the envoys must reject such charges and reply that the tsar had not called B. Khmelnyts'ky and the Host, but, on the contrary, had ordered his borderland *voyevody* not to permit any quarrels with the Polish and Lithuanian people. Concerning the Zaporozhian Cherkassy, the envoys were ordered to tell the Lords of the Council that the Zaporozhian Cherkassy "cause a lot of trouble in the tsar's border cities" by settling without permission along the rivers Vorskla and Sula, cutting hay, setting up beehives and by imposing "all types of insults and burdens" on the tsar's people in Oleshnya, Konotop, and in other places. And these same Cherkassy boast that they raid the tsar's land with the Crimean Tatars." Therefore, it is necessary that the Lords of the Council inform the king of this so that he can prohibit them from "quarreling with and provoking the tsar's borderland people" (No. 135 of 1650, Vol. II). The report of the tsar's envoys denied the accusation that the tsar was aiding the Ukrainian Cossacks and stated on the contrary that the tsar, cognizant of the "Perpetual Peace," had refused to receive the Cossacks. To prove their point the envoys showed the Council a letter of B. Khmelnyts'ky to the tsar, which contained his signature and the seal of the Zaporozhian Host; at the request of the Council, the envoys *permitted them to make a copy of the letter* (No. 144 of March 1650, Vol. II). Hetman Khmelnyts'ky and Secretary General I. Vyhovsky discovered this and the latter complained about it in a conversation in Kaniv with the merchant F. Gureyev, a Muscovite spy, confident that it would be reported to those who had sent him. Vyhovsky said, "Moscow is committing an injustice because the letters of Hetman Khmelnyts'ky to the sovereign in Moscow, which requested the tsar to accept the Hetman into his Muscovite state, were disclosed to

the king in Warsaw" (No. 203 of December 1650, Vol. II). Thus, the documents actually are evidence not of *impressive aid to the Ukraine* but of the *damage* to B. Khmelnyts'ky and the Zaporozhian Host, when the tsar's envoys, pursuant to his orders, defamed them before the Polish government by supplying proof of their negotiations with a foreign power, Muscovy. The following year the tsar and boyars received the Polish embassy of S. Witowski, K. Obuchowicz and Ch. Ordynski in Moscow. These negotiations lasted almost two months. The Polish envoys wanted the tsar to join in a common attack against the Crimean Tatars who were aiding B. Khmelnyts'ky and the Zaporozhian Host in their struggle with Poland. At first the Polish envoys proposed that the tsar and the king should make common cause against both the Crimean khan and B. Khmelnyts'ky, his ally. The boyars rejected this proposition. Then the Polish envoys proposed that a joint attack be made on the Crimea and that the Polish king fight the Cossacks alone and at a later date. The boyars rejected this proposition also. Instead, they declared that the tsar would gladly join the king in sending soldiers against the Crimea; but, however, since the tsar did not wish "to spill Christian blood," he proposed that the Poles should end their own war first, i. e., with the Zaporozhian Host, "either peacefully or by force" (No. 16 of 1651, Vol. III). In 1652 the tsar sent Pronchishchev and Ivanov as his envoys to Warsaw in matters relating to the Ukraine. There the Polish government accused the tsar of allowing his *voyevody* to aid a detachment of the Zaporozhian Host, 4,000 cavalrymen under an appointive colonel of Nizhyn, Shokh (or Shokhov) to cross the Muscovite territory in the county of Bryansk. After crossing the border the Cossacks took Roslavl without a battle and without bloodshed; they also occupied some neighboring towns in Belorus' and approached the vicinity of Smolensk (the accusation was justified, as evidenced in numbers 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 of Vol. III). It took the Muscovite envoys a long time to refute the charges by saying that someone had accused the tsar out of malice. They said that, on the contrary, the tsar told Khmelnyts'ky to *stop the war with Poland and make peace with the Polish king* (No. 82 of 1652,



Vol. III). Finally, in two documents of 1653 (an order to the tsar's envoys in Warsaw and the report of the envoys B. Repnin and B. Khitrovo), we find that the "diplomatic help" of this embassy was reduced to this fact that the tsar, wanting to stop the "spilling of Christian blood," proposed that the Polish king make peace with B. Khmelnyts'ky and the Zaporozhian Host on the basis of the Zboriv Treaty. The reply to this proposition was that "no such treaty ever existed because the king does not conclude treaties with his subjects who are, moreover, rebels" (Nos. 155, 179 of 1653, Vol. III). These quotations from documents published in the collection do not only fail to support the allegation of "impressive diplomatic aid" or "defense of the interests of the Ukraine," but on the contrary prove that the tsar's diplomatic moves were *detrimental to the interests of the Ukraine*, who was fighting for her freedom and national independence and not for coexistence with Poland on the basis of a treaty.

(f) Every careful reader will observe a very typical detail of Muscovite-Ukrainian relations during the period covered by this collection (1620-1654) and it is the perfect espionage system organized by the tsarist government in the Ukraine. There are many documents in this collection which contain interesting data on the forms and methods of espionage and information about the men who directed this system and those who played the actual roles of spies. Almost every document, whether an order of the tsar to the embassies or to individual envoys sent by the tsar to Khmelnyts'ky, or to the tsar's *voyevody* of provinces or cities bordering on the Ukraine, or the reports of envoys, *voyevody*, and Muscovite merchants—in general all those who were returning home after a stay in Ukraine—contained orders on the gathering of "secret information" or on the reports of gathered "secrets." This general theme was: what went on and what was going on in the Ukraine; what is being done and what will be done; what people say and what their attitude is toward the tsar and to the Muscovite state; information pertaining to Hetman Khmelnyts'ky, Secretary General I. Vyhovsky, the colonels, Cossack officers, the masses of the Ukrainian people, and so forth. The tsar generously rewarded his informants with

sable, money, promises of "tsar's favor and kindness," and entertainment with vodka and wine, etc. Passive sources of "information,"—unwilling or deliberate espionage agents—were all those kindhearted and talkative Cherkassy who accepted bribes without seeing anything wrong in the "gathering of such secret information," especially since it would be rewarded by Muscovite flattery, money and promises. In addition to this espionage system, the tsarist agents conducted a shrewd propaganda campaign on behalf of their tsar and his tsardom. With this system of propaganda and espionage the Muscovite government was slowly and unhurriedly spinning a net which, when the time arrived, it threw over Ukraine. One of the first to fall victim was the hetman's closest associate, Secretary General I. Vyhovsky (No. 115 of 1652, Vol. III).

Moscow's diplomatic relations with its neighbors were conducted at that time by special embassies or envoys which were sent from time to time to neighboring states or lands; they were not permanently placed envoys accredited to the head of the state or government. Therefore, the only way of obtaining information about a foreign state was to send an embassy or envoy, or organize an espionage system. But the evil of the latter was that it assumed all the despicable aspects of treachery—all its negative, rotten, and immoral manifestations—and at the same time there was no assurance that the information thus gathered was true or merely invented for monetary reward. Moreover, the result of this espionage, this "secret information" was accepted at face value in Moscow, and, what is even worse, Moscow's national policy was based on such data.

At first the Muscovite system of gathering "secret information" was successful and did not evoke the Ukrainians' distrust, except for those who had played the role of paid Muscovite informers in their own interest. Later, when this espionage system assumed the proportions of persistent questioning and obvious bribery, the Ukrainians began to exercise more caution, finally refusing to give information to official or volunteer spies. For example, in 1650 the *voyevoda* of Belgorod, B. Repnin, informed the tsar: "And when the *voyevody* send people to gather information, then

my sovereign, they, the Cherkassy, know it all with certainty. They say to the sovereign's Russian people that they, the Russian people, come to the Lithuanian land not for commerce but to pick up information" (No. 192, Vol. II). The colonel of Chyhryn, F. Korobka, wrote in 1649 to the *voyevoda* of Volnov, F. Arsenyev: "When you write that the Cossacks do not wish you to come, we cannot order you to come to the Ukraine. Bohdan, the great hetman and your great tsar, know what to do. And if you, Governor Fyodor Yuryevich, want more information, then communicate with his grace, the great Bohdan Khmelnyts'ky, and you will get all the news; we cannot tell you any more" (No. 97, Vol. II). Undoubtedly, B. Khmelnyts'ky knew of the espionage system of the Muscovite envoys in Chyhryn since it was carried out almost before his eyes. And he had surmised Vyhovsky's role in this matter, too. In Streshnyev's report—the Muscovite envoy to B. Khmelnyts'ky—it is stated that Secretary General I. Vyhovsky had admonished the envoy to "give him a small gift and not speak words of praise, *because the hetman is angry with him, Ivan*, anyway.... And you, the envoys, should give me the sovereign's gift in secret and should not speak words of praise in front of the hetman..." (No. 115 of September 1653, Vol. III). This might explain the project that arose at the hetman's conference with his staff in Chyhryn on February 1654, namely, to place the Secretary General Vyhovsky at the head of the Cossack mission which was to go to the tsar to conclude the treaty. Moscow learned of this and the *voyevoda* of Putivl was ordered to meet and accompany the mission "with special honors." Subsequently, the Cossacks appointed Judge General Samiylo Bohdanovych Zarudny and Colonel Pavlo Teterya of Pereyaslav in place of Vyhovsky.

Finally, it is imperative to pause and consider another characteristic peculiarity of this publication, one which was noted in connection with the errors in the names of documents. On the basis of these documents, I seriously oppose the phrase used by the editors: "Reunion of the Ukrainian people with the brotherly Russian people." Actually, not one of the printed documents uses this term and it is completely lacking in the final documents,

e. g., the tsar's writs, the resolutions of the Moscow *Zemski sobor*, the resolutions of the Pereyaslav Council, the Treaty "articles" and the resolutions of the tsar and boyars. These documents and many others use such expressions: "The Zaporozhian Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnyts'ky, humbly requests that he (the tsar) would accept them for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and command the hetman and the entire Zaporozhian Host, to be received under his majestic hand.... And if the sovereign does not show his mercy, then they will unwillingly become subjects of the Turkish Sultan and the Crimean Khan" (No. 1 of 1651, Vol. III). Khmelnyts'ky's envoys in the Foreign Office, K. Burley and S. Muzhylovsky, declared: "The great sovereign should accept them for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and command the hetman with the entire Zaporozhian Host to come under his sovereign's majestic hand and aid them against their enemies, the Poles, with counsel and military force" (No. 153 of 1653, Vol. III). B. Khmelnyts'ky, addressing the Cossacks at the Council of Pereyaslav, said, "And the Orthodox Christian, the great sovereign, the Eastern tsar, is of the same Greek law, the same rite; we are one body of the Orthodox Church, whose head is Jesus Christ..." (from the report of the Muscovite embassy of 1654, No. 205). The Council of Pereyaslav resolved: "We would rather die under the Eastern Orthodox tsar's firm hand in our true faith, than fall into the hands of Christ's enemy, the pagan" (*ibid.*). On Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich's part, in a writ to Khmelnyts'ky, it was announced, "And we, the great sovereign, are pious in our God's good grace and desirous with you that the Christian faith should not decline among you, but increase and that the flock of our God's great Shepherd, Christ, should multiply, as is said, 'And there shall be one flock and one Shepherd.' We have consented to accept you under the majestic hand of his Imperial Majesty so that you would not be an enemy of Christ's Cross in contempt and abuse" (No. 169 of 1653). Further, in the resolution of the *Zemski sobor* of October 1, 1653 there is noted the tsar's address to the *Sobors* "And they, the Zaporozhian Cherkassy, request the tsar's mercy so that he, the great sovereign, shall not permit the Orthodox Christian faith to be

uprooted and the holy churches of God be wrecked by oppressors, but he shall take mercy upon them and consent to accept B. Khmelnyts'ky and the entire Zaporozhian Host under his sovereign hand" (No. 197 of October 1, 1653, Vol. III). And the resolution of the *Zemski sobor* states, "And the boyars and councilors said that the great sovereign, the tsar and grand prince, Aleksei Mikhailovich of all Russia, would consent to accept under his majestic hand, B. Khmelnyts'ky and the entire Zaporozhian Host with cities and lands for the glory of the Orthodox Christian faith and God's Holy Churches" (*ibid.*). In the tsar's writ of October 2, 1653 the tsar informed Khmelnyts'ky that the mission sent by the tsar to Poland had not received satisfaction from the king for the tsar's claimed insult to his dignity and on the subject of an armistice with the Zaporozhian Host; therefore, the tsar decided "to accept B. Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhian Host with cities and lands for the sake of the *Orthodox Christian faith under the tsar's majestic hand*" (No. 198, Vol. III). The tsar's decree—Article 9 of the Treaty of 1654—reads: "Because of the many improprieties, insults, and falsehoods on the king's part and desirous of defending the *Orthodox Christian faith from persecutions and from those who wish to destroy God's church and the Christian faith and wishing to defend all Orthodox Christians from Latinization*, I have accepted you under our sovereign hand. . . ." (No. 245 of 1654). In the description of the tsar's audience with Khmelnyts'ky's envoys, we find the following interesting variant. "And we, the great sovereign and Imperial Majesty have done so (accepted the Zaporozhian Host) in devotion to the true faith: it is not for any other reason save this, that the true Christian churches should not be insulted and wrecked by the Latins and the true Christian faith held in contempt, and you, true Christians, in slavery and unworthy suffering" (No. 240 of March 13, 1654).

These quotations from the most important documents are categorical evidence that the basic and sole motive for the acceptance of the Ukraine under the rule of the Muscovite tsar (stipulated on certain treaty provisions) on both sides was the commonly announced and professed Orthodox faith, i. e., the adherence to

the Christian Orthodox Church and the desire to remain within the Orthodox faith and to defend this faith, the holy churches, and each other from the enemies of Orthodoxy (the Poles) by a mutual effort. And conversely, there was no declaration of unity of blood, national affinity, adherence to a single ethnic group, or any idea of "birth, community of origin, eternal affinity and brotherhood of the Russian and Ukrainian people," made on this or any other occasion. It is precisely these ideas which the editors of the introductory article consider to be the sole motive and basis of the Act of 1654 and for which they choose to invent a term "Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia." They remain completely silent on the idea of a common faith in Orthodox Christianity being the basic motive of B. Khmelnyts'ky's and the Zaporozhian Host's submission to the "majestic hand" of the Muscovite tsar.

The authors of the introductory article have relied on the authority of V. Lenin, who wrote in his works about "the proximity of the Russian and Ukrainian people by language, domicile, character, and history" (?), and on the achievements of "Soviet historical science." They rejected the idea "accepted by bourgeois historians" and by "Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist historiography (M. Hrushevsky and his followers)" that the Ukrainian people existed long before the establishment of the Old Rus' Kievan state and that there had never been any "Old Russian nationality." All these ideas, according to the article, are the "inventions of bourgeois historians" and "a gross falsification of historical facts" aimed at undermining the affinity and "centuries-old affinity of the Russian and Ukrainian people." Instead, they alleged that the only correct idea is that "of a unified Old Russian nationality" from which the three East Slavic peoples (Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian) originated; this "Old Russian nationality" had a powerful unified state (Kievan), a unified, highly-developed culture and it was in this state that the idea of the "recognition of the unity of the Russian land" was born. The powerful Kievan state collapsed as a result of unfavorable circumstances ("the process of feudal differentiation, incursions of Tatar-Mongols and other aggressors"). In

the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, on the base of this "old Russian nationality," the "formation of three brotherly nations," took place. And further, "the Ukrainian language came into being on the base of the Old Russian language... and developed in close contact with the Russian language." The authors of the introductory article conclude their presentation of the idea of common origin and affinity of the Russian and Ukrainian people by saying: "The community of origin of the two brotherly peoples and of the language roots have caused, over the entire period of history, the *closest proximity of culture and the recognition of the oneness of the Russian and Ukrainian people.*" In their argumentation these authors have outraced even Lenin, who expressed himself merely for "proximity" of the Russian and Ukrainian people, whereas the present authors have talked themselves into the proposition of *oneness of the Russian and Ukrainian people.*

In their declaration of a "oneness of the Russian and Ukrainian people" the authors of the introductory article ignore completely the historical documents collected and published under their own editorship. These documents corroborate neither the "oneness" of these people, nor the close affiliation of the Ukrainian and Muscovite-Rus' language. Some Ukrainian documents call the Ukrainian people a "Russian people" (*rosiys'ky narod*). In B. Khmelnyts'ky's writ of March 17, 1654 (No. 236, Vol. III) to the tsar, reference is made to "All the Christian Russian clerics and the lay people of all ranks" (and the Ukraine is called a "Russian State," *ibid.*), while the Russian people are called "Muscovite people" or "Muscovites." Muscovite documents, on the other hand, call the Ukrainian people "Cherkassy," "Lithuanian people," "foreigners, newly-arrived Cherkassy" or "Zaporozhian Cherkassy" (Vol. I, No. 164, 193; Vol. II, Nos. 140, 142, 152, 192 and many others). At that time in Moscow the Ukrainian language was called the "Byelorussian language"; Ukrainian documents of the seventeenth century had to be translated into the Muscovite language, and negotiations with Ukrainian envoys were conducted with the aid of interpreters.

All these "new achievements of Soviet historiography" remind us of something *old*, something long ago disproved and rejected by historical science both in the Ukraine as well as in Russia. These are the very same ideas of Pan-Russianism which long reigned in Russian historiography; it had been initiated and supported by the tsarist government and became the prop for the justification of the Russification policy.

In summing up these remarks pertaining to the editorial method and the interpretation of documents, I have come to the conclusion that this publication under the title, *Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia*, pursues an object which has nothing in common with archeography or history, or in general any *science* in the true meaning of this word. The publishers of this book, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, have collected 747 historical documents and material which cover the short period from 1620 to 1654 and, under the guise of this mass of documentary material, are attempting to introduce those ideas of Pan-Russianism. These ideas have long been known, but here they are renovated and presented as "new creations of Soviet historiography." The argumentation by which the authors wish to prove the historical truth of these ideas is not supported by published documents. Thus, one of the most characteristic features of this publication is the obvious and complete divergence between the ideas promulgated by the publishers and the ideas inherent in the historical documents of this collection.

Nevertheless, the collection in a single publication of 747 historical documents, the majority of which relate to the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their national and social liberation from the Polish state, has to be considered a useful undertaking. The majority of these documents have, until now, been in the Moscow archives—admittedly a difficult place to penetrate—and have been published for the first time. There are many original documents among them, written in a beautiful seventeenth century Ukrainian, which is very close to the modern Ukrainian literary language. Thirty letters of Hetman B. Khmelnyts'ky,



written in his own hand, are included in this group. A small portion of these documents have been previously published (276) in various Russian and Ukrainian publications, but they are now rare and inaccessible. Therefore, the publication of these documents in a single collection remains a convenience.