

# BUKOVINA IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF 1914

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The question of Bukovina was one of the problems which became an object of international negotiations shortly after the outbreak of World War I. This happened not only because soon after the opening of hostilities Bukovina was turned into a battlefield and was conquered and reconquered time and again. Of decisive importance were the persistent efforts of both rival camps to induce Rumania to take action against their adversaries. To attain this objective, the Central Powers as well as the Triple Entente made many an offer and promise to the Bucharest government, including offers of a territorial nature. While the Central Powers were ready to support Rumania's expansion first of all at the expense of the Russian Empire and Serbia, the Entente Powers did not hesitate to offer Bucharest territories belonging to Austria-Hungary. It is, therefore, obvious that the question of Bukovina was primarily an object of negotiations conducted between the Imperial Russian government and the governments of other Entente Powers, on the one hand, and the government of Rumania, on the other.

## I.

Attempts to win the cooperation of Rumania were made by both opposing groups of the European powers from the very beginning of the July crisis of 1914. Diplomatic activities which aimed at influencing the Bucharest government and inducing it to participate in common action increased with the deterioration of the general situation and with the growing possibility of transformation of the Austro-Serbian conflict into a general European conflagration.

Efforts of the Russian government to gain Rumania's support in the crisis started the day after the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. On July 24, 1914, the Bucha-

rest government was invited by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to take part in the diplomatic action of the great powers.<sup>1</sup> Two days later Sazonov instructed Poklevsky-Kozell, the Russian envoy at Bucharest, to refer in a talk with the Rumanian Prime Minister to the common interests of Rumania and Serbia and to find out what position Bucharest would take if the conflict became inevitable. "If Austria," Sazonov telegraphed to Poklevsky on July 26, 1914, "moves today against Serbia with the charge of irredentism, the same fate will meet Rumania tomorrow or she (i.e., Rumania) herself will have to give up forever the realization of her national ideal."<sup>2</sup>

Having received Poklevsky's report about Bratianu's reluctance to define the policy of the Rumanian government in the event of war, Sazonov sent on July 29, the day after Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia, new instruc-

<sup>1</sup> See Sazonov's tel. No. 1488, 24/11 July 1914 (Komissiia pri TsIK SSSR po izdaniyu dokumentov epokhi imperializma, headed by M. N. Pokrovsky, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma: Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitel'stv 1878-1917* gg., Series III, 1914-1917, Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1931 et seq. Vol. 5 (1934), No. 23. [Hereafter cited as *M.O.* If the series is not specifically mentioned, the reference to series III, 1914-1917, is to be understood]); and the Russian foreign office diary, 24/11 July 1914 (*Ibid.*, No. 25). Cf. C. Diamandy, "Ma mission en Russie 1914-1918," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. 49 (1929), p. 798 ff.; and Buchanan to Grey, July 24, 1914, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley. 11 vols. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926 et seq. Vol. 11 (1926), No. 101.

In the above-mentioned Russian foreign office diary the following remark was made: "It was of the greatest advantage for us that Rumania should be drawn in on our side, while for Rumania it was manifestly flattering to participate as an equal in the diplomatic steps taken by the Great Powers." Quoted after *How the War Began: The Diary of the Russian Foreign Office 3-20 [Old Style] July 1914*. Translated from the Original Russian by Major W. Cyprian Bridge. With a Foreword by S. D. Sazonov and an Introduction by Baron M. F. Schilling. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *M.O.*, 5, No. 85

As a matter of fact, Poklevsky had already telegraphed Sazonov on the previous day that he had asked Bratianu privately what attitude would be taken by Rumania were the Austrian ultimatum to result in a general European conflict. *Ibid.*, No. 72.

tions to his representative at Bucharest.<sup>3</sup> Poklevsky was authorized to answer Bratianu's questions about the attitude of the Russian government in case of war and about Russian war aims, and to insist on the clarification of Rumania's position in such an event. At the same time the Russian envoy at Bucharest was empowered to give Bratianu to understand that "the possibility of benefits for Rumania [were] not excluded" by the Russian government in case of Rumanian participation in the war against Austria. Finally, Sazonov wanted to learn what intentions the Rumanian government itself had with regard to this matter.<sup>4</sup>

On the following day, the day of the Tsar's final approval of the general Russian mobilization, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs described more exactly those "benefits which Rumania could expect in case of her participation in a war against Austria." Without awaiting Poklevsky's report on the reaction of the Rumanian government to suggestions sent from St. Petersburg on the previous day, Sazonov authorized the Russian envoy at Bucharest to declare that the Russian government was ready to support the annexation of Transylvania by Rumania.<sup>5</sup> This offer was repeated by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the next day. In a telegram sent July 31, 1914, he drew Poklevsky's attention to the news indicating the possibility of Rumania's military action against Russia on the side of Austria. In order to prevent this and to secure Rumania's non-interference and, if possible, her military cooperation against the Dual Monarchy, Sazonov was willing to promise

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 216.

One day earlier, on July 28, 1914, Sazonov had sounded out the Rumanian envoy at St. Petersburg on the attitude of Rumania in the threatening conflict, Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 806.

<sup>4</sup> The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was at that time worried by rumors about the possibility of the military cooperation of Rumania with the Central Powers against Russia. See Sazonov to Poklevsky, 28/15 July 1914, *M.O.*, 5, No. 165.

<sup>5</sup> Sazonov to Poklevsky, 30/17 July 1914, *ibid.*, No. 280.

the support of the Russian government in the acquisition of Transylvania by Rumania.<sup>6</sup>

Russia was not the only power of the Entente ready, when the outbreak of a general European war seemed imminent, to offer Transylvania to Rumania. A similar suggestion made by the President of the French Republic was reported by the Russian ambassador at Paris on August 1, 1914, the day of Germany's declaration of war on Russia. Because of rather unfavorable news from Bucharest about the alleged intentions of the Rumanian government, Poincaré expressed the view that it was necessary without loss of time to exert pressure on Rumania by promising her Transylvania.<sup>7</sup>

In the meantime Poklevsky reported that after he had informed Bratianu about Sazonov's proposal, the Rumanian Prime Minister asked whether Russia's allies would sanction the cession of an Austrian province, since Great Britain allegedly wished the restoration of the *status quo* after the end of the approaching war. When the Russian envoy had assured Bratianu that the allies would take into account pledges given by the Russian government, the Rumanian Prime Minister tried to stress the idea that the possibility of Rumania's cooperation with Russia was not excluded.<sup>8</sup>

Notwithstanding the decision of the Rumanian Crown Council on August 3, 1914, in favor of a policy of noninterference in the European war, the Russian government continued its efforts to induce Bucharest to an active cooperation against Austria-Hungary.<sup>9</sup> Even prior to Vienna's declaration of war

<sup>6</sup> Sazonov to Poklevsky, 31/18 July 1914, *ibid.*, No. 341.

<sup>7</sup> Izvolsky to Sazonov, 1 August/19 July 1914, *ibid.*, No. 411.

The next day Sazonov replied: "Since we share the view expressed by Poincaré, we have authorized Poklevsky, if he finds it possible, to promise our support for the acquisition of Transylvania by Rumania if she acts jointly with us against Austria." Sazonov to Izvolsky, 2 August/20 July 1914, *M.O.*, 5, No. 453.

The view of the President of the French Republic was communicated to the Russian envoy at Bucharest, Sazonov to Poklevsky, 3 August/21 July 1914, *ibid.*, No. 481.

<sup>8</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 31/18 July 1914, *M.O.*, 5, No. 365.

<sup>9</sup> Sazonov was informed about the decisions of the Rumanian Crown Council by Poklevsky's telegram dated 3 August/21 July 1914, *ibid.*, No. 504.

on Russia on August 6, new diplomatic steps were taken by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. On August 5, at a conference with the Rumanian envoy at St. Petersburg, Sazonov submitted the text of a formal Russo-Rumanian military alliance which was subsequently transmitted to Bucharest. According to the proposed treaty, Rumania was to be obligated to co-operate with all her military forces in the war against Austria-Hungary, and the Russian government, on its part, was to promise not to put an end to the war with the Dual Monarchy until the provinces of Austria-Hungary inhabited by the Rumanian population were united with Rumania.<sup>10</sup> This time there was reference not to Transylvania alone, but to "the lands of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Rumanian population"; hence, the Rumanian part of Bukovina was also included.<sup>11</sup>

In sending the text of the projected Russo-Rumanian convention to Paris and London, Sazonov proposed that simultaneously with the signing of it the territorial integrity of Rumania be guaranteed by identical written declarations by the representatives of the three great powers of the Entente

<sup>10</sup> Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 806.

The full text of the proposed alliance, as quoted in Sazonov's telegram to Izvolsky and Benckendorff dated 7 August/25 July 1914 (*M.O.*, 6, No. 22), contains the following clause:

"La Russie s'engage à ne pas cesser la guerre contre l'Autriche-Hongrie avant que les pays de la monarchie Austro-Hongroise habités par une population roumaine ne soient réunis à la couronne de Roumanie." The extent of the territory to be incorporated into Rumania was supposed to be shown on an attached map which is missing.

<sup>11</sup> The inclusion of Bukovina is explicitly confirmed by the following entry in the diary of the then-French ambassador at St. Petersburg under the date August 6, 1914:

"Sazonow m'apprend qu'il a fait venir le ministre de Roumanie, Diamandy, pour lui demander le concours immédiat de l'armée roumaine contre l'Autriche. En échange, il offre de reconnaître au cabinet de Bucarest le droit d'annexer tous les territoires austro-hongrois habités actuellement par une population roumaine, c'est-à-dire la majeure partie de la Transylvanie et la région septentrionale [sic—It should be obviously 'méridionale'] de la Bukovine." M. Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars pendant la grande guerre*. 3 vols. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1921-1922. I (1921), pp. 61-62.

at Bucharest; the representatives of France and Great Britain were also to be authorized to declare at the same time to the Rumanian government that they were acquainted with the extent of territorial cessions promised Rumania by Russia and had no objection in that respect.

The French government agreed with the terms of the Russo-Rumanian convention as proposed by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>12</sup> The British government raised no objection to the territorial acquisitions which had been offered by Russia to Rumania, and even expressed its willingness to support after the end of the war the territorial integrity of Rumania by diplomatic means, without binding itself, however, to any formal guarantee.<sup>13</sup> In order to achieve a complete harmony, the director of the Chancellery of the Russian Foreign Ministry, M. Schilling, on August 9, 1914, at a conference with the British and French ambassadors and in agreement with them, drew up the following wording of a declaration which, at Sazonov's request, was to be handed in writing and without loss of time to the Rumanian government by the representatives of Great Britain and France at Bucharest:

1. Having received communications about the terms that have been offered by Russia for the active cooperation of Rumania against Austria-Hungary, France (Great Britain) agrees to these terms, and
2. As long as Rumania will fight on the side of Russia against Austria-Hungary, France (Great Britain) will consider herself at war with any power which would attack Rumania during this time.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Izvolsky to Sazonov, 8 August/26 July 1914, F. Stieve, ed., *Iswolski im Weltkrieg: Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1914-1917*, Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1925, No. 52. [Hereafter cited as *Stieve*.]

<sup>13</sup> Benckendorff to Sazonov, 9 Aug./27 July 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 43. See also Benckendorff to Sazonov, 8 Aug./26 July 1914, *Stieve*, No. 59, and aide mémoire by Buchanan, 9 Aug./27 July 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 37.

Neither France nor Great Britain were yet in a state of war with Austria-Hungary at that time. Diplomatic relations with the Dual Monarchy were broken off by France on August 10; war was declared on Austria-Hungary by France and Great Britain on August 12, 1914.

<sup>14</sup> The original French text of the proposed declaration in Sazonov to Izvolsky and Benckendorff, 9 August/27 July 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 39.

On the same day the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs empowered his envoy in Rumania to sign jointly with the Rumanian Prime Minister the proposed Russo-Rumanian agreement in order to avoid the delay which would have been caused by the Rumanian envoy's journeying from St. Petersburg to Bucharest and back.<sup>15</sup>

The question of Bukovina became, thus, in the very first days after the outbreak of the general European war, an object in international negotiations even though the name Bukovina was hardly mentioned as yet in the diplomatic acts.

Although Russia's western allies were not yet formally at war with Austria-Hungary, the governments of both France and Great Britain approved the declaration that had been drafted at the Russian Foreign Office and was to be made at Bucharest. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the French envoy in Rumania to deliver jointly with his British colleague the proposed declaration to the Rumanian government.<sup>16</sup> The British Foreign Secretary, who likewise consented to act at Bucharest in accordance with Sazonov's proposal, suggested, however, that the words "has no objection to" (*n'a pas d'objection contre*) be substituted for the word "agrees" (*adhère*) in the first paragraph of the declaration. The British government raised no objection to the cession to Rumania of

<sup>15</sup> Sazonov to Poklevsky, 9 August/27 July 1914, *Stieve*, No. 62.

The decision of the Rumanian envoy at St. Petersburg to go to Bucharest and Sazonov's pressure to hasten Diamandy's departure are described in Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 807.

<sup>16</sup> Izvolsky to Sazonov, 10 August/28 July 1914, *Stieve*, No. 67, and 11 August/29 July 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 66.

On August 12, 1914, the French Foreign Minister Doumergue informed the French ambassador at St. Petersburg in a telegram decoded at the Russian Foreign Office:

"Nous sommes également entièrement d'accord pour donner à l'Italie et à l'Roumanie en cas de leur concours militaire toutes les assurances désirées au sujet des avantages territoriaux qui leur seront accordés à l'issue heureuse des hostilités, ces avantages étant accordés sans préjudice pour nos propres intérêts nationaux." *M.O.*, 6, No. 79.

the territories proposed by Russia, but was not willing to commit itself to participation in the annexation of those areas.<sup>17</sup>

Soon, however, the diplomatic action concerning the planned declaration that was to be made to the Rumanians by the French and British envoys at Bucharest simultaneously with the signing of the Russo-Rumanian convention, became pointless because the Rumanian government declined to sign the proposed Russo-Rumanian agreement. In a talk with the Russian envoy the Rumanian Prime Minister declared that he could not accept the Russian proposal since this would run counter to the resolution recently adopted by the Rumanian Crown Council.<sup>18</sup> Bratianu was ready merely to take note of the Russian offer if the Russian government demanded no immediate reply and left the question open; he was willing to give an official answer to the Russian proposal only after the arrival of the Rumanian envoy from St. Petersburg and after Diamandy's account of his personal talks with Sazonov. The Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs was reported to have

<sup>17</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 34, footnote 5.

<sup>18</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 12 August/30 July 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 82.

The rejection of the Russian offer by the Rumanian government is mentioned by the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg under August 13, 1914. Paléologue, *op. cit.*, I, p. 77.

The reluctance of the Rumanian government to go to war against Austria-Hungary was not incorrectly ascribed by Sir George Barclay, the British envoy at Bucharest, primarily to the opposition of the Rumanian king, the mistrust of Bulgaria, and the desire on the part of Rumanians to await clearer indications as to the development of military operations. Barclay's view was shared by his French and Russian colleagues. *M.O.*, 6, No. 157. The Russian military attaché as well as the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest were at that time likewise of the opinion that Rumania would maintain neutrality until the outcome of decisive military campaigns became clearer and that then she would join the stronger party. See Semenov's report, 17/4 August 1914 (*M.O.*, 6, No. 121); and Czernin to Berchtold, 6 and 8 August 1914 (*Österreichisch-Ungarisches Rotbuch: Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend die Beziehungen Österreich-Ungarns zu Rumänien*. 22. VII. 1914-27. VIII. 1916, Vienna, 1916, Nos. 7 and 8. [Hereafter cited as *Ö.-U. Rotbuch*].)

The anxiety prevailing at Bucharest about Bulgaria's intentions was reported repeatedly by Poklevsky (e.g., on August 2, 3, 7 and 10, 1914. See *M.O.*, 5, Nos. 469 and 502; 6, Nos. 30 and 59).



emphasized that, although at that time his government could not sign the proposed convention, the Russian suggestions were so attractive that Rumania did not wish to dismiss them altogether. Porumbaru was said to have added that any incident or any deterioration in the relations between Rumania and Austria-Hungary might permit the Rumanian government to change its attitude entirely.

In the meantime, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs recommended proceeding at Bucharest extremely cautiously and without undue haste, and avoidance of exerting too strong pressure or anything that might offend highly sensitive Rumanians and produce results quite contrary to those desired.<sup>19</sup> Taking into consideration this advice and similar suggestions of the Russian envoy in Rumania who urged that he refrain from any steps in the nature of an ultimatum, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs suspended his efforts to bring about the proposed Russo-Rumanian convention and did not insist on an official answer from the Rumanian government to the Russian proposal.<sup>20</sup>

Several weeks later, however, the situation changed. The Russian government reopened negotiations with Rumania, and, at the same time, the question of Bukovina reappeared on the chessboard of European diplomacy.

## II.

The Russian envoy at Bucharest, who had an opportunity to observe the Rumanian diplomatic and political situation on

<sup>19</sup> Izvolsky to Sazonov, 11 August/29 July 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 66; and Doumergue to Paléologue, 12 Aug. 1914, *ibid.*, No. 79.

Approximately at that time, Sazonov was informed by the Russian ambassador in Italy that the Italian envoy at Bucharest was completely convinced Rumania would join Austria against Russia. Krupensky to Sazonov, 10 August/28 July 1914, Tsentrarkhiv, *Tsarshaya Rossiya v mirovoi voine*, with a preface by M. N. Pokrovsky, Vol. 1, Leningrad, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1925, p. 154, No. 17. [Hereafter cited as *Tsar. R.*]

<sup>20</sup> In the last days of August 1914 Sazonov himself requested Russia's allies to avoid any action that might provoke the slightest suspicion on the part of the Rumanians. See *M.O.*, 6, Nos. 165 and 184, and p. 146, footnote 1.

the spot, arrived at the conclusion that under the then-existing conditions it would have been advisable for the Russian government to have first secured Rumania's neutrality.

On August 27, 1914, Poklevsky reported that the Rumanian king at a meeting with Diamandy, the Rumanian envoy who had come from St. Petersburg to Bucharest with the draft of the Russo-Rumanian convention, had pointed to the incompatibility of the proposed agreement with Rumania's alliance obligations toward the Central Powers as the circumstance hindering the acceptance of the Russian offer.<sup>21</sup>

A few days later the Russian envoy at Bucharest commented at some length upon Russo-Rumanian relations. In a report to Petrograd he argued that in view of Rumania's commitments to the Central Powers and the attitude of the Rumanian king, Rumania's neutrality policy had to be considered by Russia as a friendly act. Poklevsky expressed the opinion that it was hardly possible to induce Rumania to go to war against Austria-Hungary before further clarification of the military situation, or without such specific developments as Italy's entry into war on the side of the Entente Powers. He emphasized that, on the other hand, the continued German military successes and the very alluring offers of Russia's adversaries might facilitate efforts of the Rumanian king and other friends of the Central Powers in the country to draw Rumania into war against Russia.<sup>22</sup> After reporting that the Rumanian leaders

<sup>21</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 195, footnote 2.

Texts of the treaties concluded between Rumania and the powers of the Triple Alliance in the period 1883-1913 were published in A. F. Pribram, *Die politischen Geheimverträge Oesterreich-Ungarns 1879-1914: Nach den Akten des Wiener Staatsarchivs*, Vienna and Leipzig, Wilhelm Braumüller Universitäts-Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1920, I (English edition: *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879-1914*, 2 vols., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1920-1921, Vol. 1, *Texts of the Treaties and Agreements*).

The diplomatic situation of Rumania was summarized by Poklevsky on August 16, 1914, as follows: "All the Balkan states ingratiate themselves with Rumania, and also Russia and Austria give her friendly assurances," *M.O.*, 6, No. 114.

<sup>22</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 1 Sept./19 Aug. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 204.

About the Rumanian commitments to the Central Powers and the political

expected some definite Russian promises in return for the neutrality of Rumania, and that certain prominent personalities as well as some organs of the Rumanian press alluded even to the cession of a part of Bessarabia to Rumania by Russia, Poklevsky notified the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs that Bratianu was interested in obtaining from Russia, France, and Great Britain, in exchange for Rumania's neutrality, a written pledge guaranteeing, in the event of final victory of the three

orientation of the Rumanian king, Poklevsky had also written Sazonov earlier (e.g., on July 31 and August 12, 1914. *M.O.*, 5, No. 365; 6, No. 82).

As early as August 2, 1914, Poklevsky reported that he had answered in the affirmative Bratianu's question whether Russia would regard the maintenance of neutrality by Rumania as a token of friendship (*M.O.*, 5, No. 469). Poklevsky's view on the subject was shared by the French ambassador at London and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (*M.O.*, 6, Nos. 78 and 79).

The policy of the Rumanian government of awaiting sufficient clarification of the military situation before entering the war was also noted by other members of the diplomatic corps at Bucharest. Cf. footnote No. 18.

The influence of the Italian policy upon the attitude of the Bucharest government was mentioned by Poklevsky in his reports dated August 4 and 28, and September 11, 1914, as well. *M.O.* 5, No. 552; 6, Nos. 180 and 248.

An offer of the Central Powers to compensate Rumania with Bessarabia and the valley of Timok (district of Negotin), as well as Tisza's alleged willingness to grant concession to the Rumanians of Transylvania was reported to Sazonov by Poklevsky on August 3, 1914, *M.O.*, 5, Nos. 502 and 504. See also Berchtold to Pallavicini, 28 August 1914, a telegram decoded at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *M.O.*, 6, No. 177. Cf. *Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegausbruch 1914*, edited by K. Kautsky, M. Montgelas, and W. Schücking, 4 vols, Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927 (enlarged edition), Nos. 506, 507, 561, 582, 795, 830, 868, and Appendix IV, No. 2; *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik 1908-1914: Diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Äussern* edited by L. Bittner A. F. Pribram, H. Srbik, and H. Uebersberger, 9 vols., Vienna and Leipzig, Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930, Vol. 8, Nos. 10589, 10796, 10798, 11100, 11133, and 11182. Also Feldmarschall Conrad (von Hoetzendorf), *Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918*, Vienna, Leipzig & Munich, Rikola Verlag, 1921-1925, 5 vols., Vol. 4 (1923), pp. 167-168; 5 (1925), pp. 203 and 537.

At the end of August 1914 the possibility of an attack by Rumania on Serbia was taken into consideration by the powers of the Triple Entente in their negotiations with Serbia concerning compensations for Bulgaria. See *M.O.*, 6, No. 205.

powers and in case of a change in the then-existing equilibrium on the Balkan peninsula, the integrity of Rumania's territory and compensations in the form of those Austrian provinces where the Rumanian population was in the majority. According to the report of the Russian envoy at Bucharest, the Rumanian Prime Minister remarked that "in such a document he would draw enough strength to withstand all attempts to seek the assurance of Rumanian interests by other means." Finally, Poklevsky stressed the importance and advantages for Russia of the suggested understanding.<sup>23</sup>

Sazonov was not much impressed, however, by the arguments of the Russian envoy at Bucharest. After the rejection of the proposed offensive alliance by Rumania it was necessary, in the opinion of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to await further clarification of the military situation and, in the meantime, to continue the parleys with the Rumanian government without, at the same time, granting hastily any "concrete commitments in exchange for unproved promises."<sup>24</sup>

Sazonov instructed Poklevsky to tell the Rumanian Prime Minister for the time being that Petrograd continued to be disposed very kindly toward Rumania and her interests, but that the answer to the suggested understanding could be given only after consultation of the Russian government with the governments of France and Great Britain.

A few days later the Russian envoy at Bucharest made another attempt to convince his superior of the advisability of concluding the proposed arrangement with Bratianu by which Rumania, for the maintenance of her neutrality, would have been promised the Austro-Hungarian provinces which had Rumanian majorities. Poklevsky also referred to assurances of the Rumanian Prime Minister that such an agreement would by no

<sup>23</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 2 Sept./20 Aug. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 209. The original text of the quotation in Russian.

<sup>24</sup> "Polozhitel'nykh obyazatel'stv v obmen na goloslovnye obeshchaniya"—Sazonov to Poklevsky, 3 September/21 Aug. 1914, *Tsar. R.*, p. 158, No. 26.

In the first days of September 1914 the battle in Galicia was approaching its climax and on September 3, Lviv, the capital of Galicia, was taken by the Imperial Russian army.

means prevent Rumania from taking action against the Habsburg Monarchy if Rumanian interests required it.<sup>25</sup>

Soon thereafter, however, the Russian envoy at Bucharest submitted a new suggestion to Sazonov. On September 14, 1914, Poklevsky telegraphed to Petrograd:

It seems to me that it would now be useful and timely to propose confidentially to the Rumanian government that it occupy with Rumanian troops that part of Bukovina held by us which is populated by Rumanians. Even if she (i.e., Rumania) did not decide to accept our proposal, the latter would represent, nevertheless, new evidence of our friendly attitude toward Rumania and would dispel apprehensions existing here in some circles regarding our intention to annex to Russia the provinces of Austria-Hungary populated by the Rumanians.<sup>26</sup>

Another telegram sent by the Russian envoy at Bucharest to Sazonov on the same day disclosed why such a proposal seemed then to Poklevsky "useful and timely." The Russian envoy reported that the news about the recent Russian and French victories resulted in an outburst of enthusiasm and mass demonstrations in Bucharest, and that the movement in favor of a war with the Habsburg Monarchy was supported by prominent figures of Rumanian society and by leaders of various parties.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 9 Sept./27 Aug. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 237. The telegram is dated 8 Sept./26 Aug. 1914, in *Tsar. R.*, p. 158, No. 28.

<sup>26</sup> The original Russian text in *Tsar. R.*, p. 160, No. 32.

On September 11, 1914, general retreat in Galicia was ordered by the Supreme Command of the Austro-Hungarian Army. See Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 702 f. By the middle of September 1914 the greater part of Galicia and most of Bukovina were occupied by the Imperial Russian armies.

<sup>27</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 277, footnote 1.

One day earlier, on Sept. 13, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest reported from Sinaia to Vienna: "Ministerpräsident (i.e., Bratianu) steht unter dem Eindrucke, dass unsere Situation in Galizien höchst ungünstig sei, und wollte Näheres von mir erfahren. Ich erklärte ihm, er befände sich im Irrtum, unsere Lage sei nicht so schlecht, wie er meine, und wir hätten allen Grund, voll Vertrauen in die Zukunft zu blicken. Trotzdem blieb Herr Bratiano bei seiner Auffassung und der Ansicht, dass unsere militärische Situation höchst kritisch sei.

Letztere Auffassung ist hier leider überhaupt sehr verbreitet. Die Stimmung uns gegenüber hat sich in ganz bedeutendem Masse verschlechtert, und die

Poklevsky's proposal was approved by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the text of a communication which was to be made to the Rumanian government was worked out at Petrograd. Since, however, in the event of Rumanian acceptance of the Russian proposal, the Rumanian troops would have come into contact with Russian forces in Bukovina, Sazonov wished to learn whether, from the military point of view, there were any objections to the suggested diplomatic step at Bucharest. He inquired, therefore, about the opinion held by the Russian General Headquarters.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile the Tsar approved the proposed diplomatic move at Bucharest, and also declared himself in favor of sending to the then-Russian-occupied capital of Bukovina an official of the Diplomatic Bureau, who was to be authorized to explain that the question of the future boundary was still to be examined, and that therefore the utmost caution had to be displayed in order, without pre-determining anything, to inspire the Rumanians neither with undesirable apprehensions nor with excessive expectations.<sup>29</sup> On September 16, 1914, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs empowered Poklevsky to communicate to the Rumanian government the following declaration:

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Agitation für eine aktive Kooperation mit der Entente sehr zugenommen." *Ö.-U. Rotbuch*, No. 10. Cf. Czernin to Berchtold, 19, September 1914, *ibid.*, No. 12, and Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 741 and 767-768.

As early as September 6, 1914, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople informed Sazonov that the Russian victories in Galicia had made an "enormous impression" in Rumania. See *Tsar. R.*, p. 158, No. 27.

<sup>28</sup> Sazonov to Kudashev, 15/2 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 258.

The director of the diplomatic bureau at the Russian General Headquarters answered the following day that the Commander-in-Chief agreed to the proposed diplomatic action at Bucharest provided wide-spread publicity were given to the fact that the Rumanian troops entered Bukovina at Russia's invitation. See "Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del," *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, Vol. 26 (1928), p. 7, footnote 1. Excerpts from Kudashev's answer telegram are published in *M.O.*, 6, p. 252, footnote 4, but there the condition under which the Russian Commander-in-Chief agreed to the proposed Russian diplomatic step at Bucharest is inaccurately ascribed by the editor to Sazonov.

<sup>29</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 252, footnote 3.

Having occupied a part of Bukovina, Russia has taken the first step toward the liberation of that province from the Austrian yoke, the liberation which unites the Russian and the Rumanian peoples in one desire. The Imperial Government, therefore, addresses the Royal Government anew with an invitation to join it in order to accelerate the accomplishment of this common task, and requests it to occupy on its part without delay southern Bukovina and Transylvania. The dislocation of the Russian and the Rumanian troops in Bukovina could be regulated by mutual agreement of commanders-in-chief of both armies, guided exclusively by considerations of purely military order, without prejudice to the subsequent delimitation of the territories, to which both Governments will proceed in due time on the basis of the ethnographic distribution of the population.<sup>30</sup>

By this statement the Imperial Russian government was officially implying its claim to that part of Bukovina which was predominantly inhabited by the Ukrainian population.

Various means were applied by Sazonov to induce Rumania to accept the Russian proposal. Efforts were made by him from the beginning to overcome doubts and hesitation on the part of the Bucharest government.

Anticipating the Rumanian concern about the possible Bulgarian threat to the rear of the Rumanian army, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs advised Poklevsky, the day after the dispatch of the Russian offer, to explain at Bucharest that since the Austrian main forces had been destroyed, no considerable number of troops would be needed to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania and that, consequently, Rumania would be able to retain enough forces on her Bulgarian border.<sup>31</sup>

Having learned about rumors that the Viennese cabinet promised to grant Transylvania autonomy if Rumania took action against Russia, Sazonov instructed the Russian envoy at Bucharest to verify the accuracy of that information and, if it proved to be true, to point out to the Rumanians that Russia offered them not merely autonomy but the annexation of Transylvania.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> The original French text in *M.O.*, 6, No. 263.

<sup>31</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 257, footnote 2.

<sup>32</sup> Sazonov to Poklevsky, 17/4 Sept. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 271.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs also wished to avoid any needless misunderstanding which might have produced an unfavorable impression in Bucharest at that time. When a proposal suggesting the dispatch of the Russian troops into New Dobrudja became known at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov was anxious lest the Rumanians assumed that Russia intended to send her forces to Rumanian Dobrudja. He ordered Poklevsky on September 19 to declare to Bratianu that the idea, considered purposeless at Petrograd, had not originated there.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs initiated a new diplomatic action when the first news indicated that one of the principal factors restraining the Bucharest government from the acceptance of the Russian offer was Rumania's fear of a Bulgarian attack.<sup>34</sup> On September 21, Sazonov proposed that the following declaration be made by Russia, France, and Great Britain at Bucharest:

If the Rumanian Government, according to the offer made to it by Russia, France, and Great Britain, proceeds to the occupation of Transylvania and of the Rumanian part of Bukovina, the three Powers mentioned will use all their authority to prevent Bulgaria from an attack upon Rumania as long as the latter will make common cause with the three Powers in the present war against Austria-Hungary.<sup>35</sup>

In another telegram sent on the same day to Paris and London, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed himself in favor of a joint declaration at Bucharest and remarked that Rumania's action, although of less importance than at the beginning of the war, would nevertheless definitively prevent Rumania from joining subsequently the Dual Monarchy, would draw off at least a small part of the Austrian forces for protection of Hungary, and might affect Italy.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 280, footnote 2.

<sup>34</sup> See Izvolsky to Sazonov, 20/7 Sept. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 285. Also Poklevsky to Sazonov, 19/6 Sept. 1914, *Tsar. R.*, p. 161, No. 36.

<sup>35</sup> The original text in French. See *M.O.*, 6, No. 288.

<sup>36</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 282, footnote 3.

Two days later, on Sept. 23, 1914, Izvolsky replied that Delcassé agreed with



Sazonov did not limit himself, however, to efforts aimed at overcoming by persuasion the doubts and hesitation of the Rumanian government, or to attempts directed at securing Rumania by diplomatic guarantees. Well informed of internal developments in Rumania, particularly about the outburst of enthusiasm there which followed the French and Russian military victories and about the growing movement among Rumanians in favor of a war with the Habsburg Monarchy, he decided also to exert pressure on the Bucharest cabinet. Immediately after the transmission of the Russian proposal requesting Rumania to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania, Sazonov, in the next telegram, instructed Poklevsky to give the Russian offer, if it were possible under local conditions, widespread publicity even if the latter had to be importunate.<sup>37</sup> Suspecting a few days later that the Rumanian government was trying to conceal the Russian proposal, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked Poklevsky anew to give it the most extensive publicity. The Rumanian people and army had to know, Sazonov continued, that Russia, having created by her victories most favorable conditions for the realization of the old dream of the Rumanians, herself requested the Bucharest government to occupy, almost without effort, Transylvania and southern Bukovina, and that if Rumania failed to take advantage of this, the blame would fall exclusively on the Rumanian government.<sup>38</sup>

### III.

Yet all the efforts of the Tsarist government to induce the Bucharest cabinet to occupy at once southern Bukovina and

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the formula as proposed by Sazonov. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs interpreted the expression "all their authority" in the sense of a moral pressure for, in his opinion, the allies could not have in mind any military action against Bulgaria. *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 257, footnote 2.

<sup>38</sup> Sazonov to Poklevsky, 20/7 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 282.

Writing about the Russian offer, Diamandy remarked: "Cette communication, qui aurait dû demeurer secrète, fut intentionnellement colportée dans le public." Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 809.

Transylvania proved useless. On September 21, 1914, the Russian envoy at Bucharest reported that Bratianu declined the Russian offer. After Poklevsky had made the prescribed communication, the Rumanian Prime Minister, visibly excited, asked him to leave it in written form and promised to give an answer at Sinaia, alluding to the necessity of meeting the King. On the next day in Sinaia, Bratianu told the Russian envoy to thank the Imperial Government for its friendly proposal, but expressed the wish to let it remain open because an immediate acceptance of it would have been equivalent to Rumania's declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, and Rumania could not take such a decision at the given moment.<sup>39</sup>

As a matter of fact, Poklevsky had given Petrograd to understand as early as September 19 that a negative reply by the Rumanian government to the Russian offer was to be expected.<sup>40</sup> In spite of a powerful movement for active cooperation with the Entente Powers and continued violent demonstrations in Bucharest, the Rumanian Prime Minister was reported to have been convinced that the time for action had not yet come. He told the Russian envoy that for the time being he, Bratianu, could not assume the responsibility for an immediate entry of Rumania into the war and that, were public opinion to continue exerting a strong pressure on him through the manifestations, he and the liberal party would prefer to withdraw from the government. Notwithstanding the great victories of the Entente Powers at the Marne and in Galicia in the first half of September 1914, the Rumanian Prime Minister considered, according to Poklevsky, the general military situation still too complicated to involve Rumania in war.<sup>41</sup> Another factor that,

<sup>39</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 21/8 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 289.

The Bucharest government was not even willing at that time to prohibit completely the transit of military supplies and personnel of the Central Powers through Rumania to the then still neutral Bulgaria and Turkey. See *M.O.*, 6, p. 287, footnote 1.

<sup>40</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 19/6 September 1914, *Tsar. R.*, p. 161, No. 36.

<sup>41</sup> Bratianu's similar attitude two months later caused the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest to remark ironically that the Rumanian Prime Minister belonged to those "friends" of the Habsburg Monarchy "welche meinen, die Si-

in the opinion of the Russian envoy at Bucharest, influenced Bratianu's policy was the fear of a Bulgarian attack from the rear if Rumania were drawn into the European war.<sup>42</sup> At the

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tuation sei noch nicht reif, man müsse erst warten, ob wir (i.e., Austria-Hungary) wirklich geschlagen werden." Czernin to Berchtold, 14 November 1914, *Ö.-U. Rotbuch*, No. 24.

<sup>42</sup> Bratianu's preoccupation with Bulgaria was also mentioned by the Russian envoy two days later, on Sept. 21, 1914. Declining the Russian offer, the Rumanian Prime Minister referred again to Bulgaria and argued that it was impossible for Rumania to wage war on two fronts, whereas retention of a considerable part of the Rumanian army to guard the Bulgarian border would make Rumania's assistance less valuable for Russia. See *M.O.*, 6, No. 289.

On Sept. 15, 1914, the Russian envoy at Sofia reported that, in the opinion of his Rumanian colleague, Rumania could be secured against Bulgaria by a promise to cede the territory lost by Bulgaria to Rumania in 1913. See *M.O.*, 6, p. 280, footnote 2.

Rumania was also threatened with reprisals by the Turkish fleet, reinforced by the German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau." According to Pallavicini's report dated Sept. 22, 1914, the German ambassador at Constantinople declared to the Rumanian envoy on that day that if even a single Rumanian soldier crossed Transylvania's border, the Turkish fleet would immediately destroy Constantza. See *M.O.*, 6, No. 343.

According to Giers' telegram dated Sept. 30, 1914, and based on the information of the Rumanian envoy at Constantinople, the Bulgarian envoy at Bucharest was authorized to notify Bratianu that if Rumania opened hostilities against Austria-Hungary, Bulgarian troops would enter Dobrudja; the Turkish envoy at Bucharest was instructed to declare to Bratianu at the same time that in such a case Turkey would support Bulgaria with her troops. See *Tsar. R.*, pp. 44-45, No. 84; also *M.O.*, 6, No. 334. In a statement made by the Turkish envoy, Bratianu was told, according to Poklevsky's report dated October 2, 1914, that if any Balkan state entered the European war, Turkey would be forced to give up her neutrality. See *M.O.*, 6, p. 346, footnote 3. The Turkish and Bulgarian steps were taken not without stimulation by the Central Powers. See Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, p. 203.

In a decoded telegram transmitted by Giers to Petrograd on Oct. 4, 1914, the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople expressed the opinion that Bucharest had quieted down because of apprehensions about exposure, in case of Rumania's action against Austria-Hungary, to an attack by Turkey and Bulgaria, particularly in connection with the appearance of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. See *M.O.*, 6, p. 346, footnote 3.

The cruiser "Breslau" had gone to the Black Sea to carry out reconnoitering there on Sept. 20 and 22; the cruiser "Goeben" on Sept. 21, 1914. See *Tsar. R.*, p. 44, No. 83 and p. 43, No. 82; *M.O.*, 6, p. 292, footnote 3, and No. 336.

same time, the Rumanian Prime Minister was said to have believed that it was not possible to enter into confidential preliminary negotiations with Bulgaria because the contents of the parleys would have been immediately known at Vienna. But the main reason for Bratianu's hesitation in all probability was, in Poklevsky's opinion, the opposition of the Rumanian King.<sup>43</sup>

At the time when the Russian government was attempting to induce Rumania to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania, the Central Powers contemplated concessions in Bukovina and Transylvania for Rumania's active cooperation in the war against Russia.

When the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest reported that Rumania would be ready to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers if the district of Suceava were ceded, the Supreme Command of the Austrian army spoke in support of the idea. On September 11, 1914, the very day when, at the suggestion of the chief of staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, the battle in Galicia was broken off and the general retreat ordered, a telegram was sent by Archduke Frederick to Francis Joseph asking the Emperor, in view of the then-existing military situation, to consent to the sacrifice of Suceava as a price

<sup>43</sup>The Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest reported on September 19, 1914: "Der Schrei 'Wir wollen nach Siebenbürgen!' ist an der Tagesordnung. Bratianu wird immer kleinlauter und ängstlicher—der König ist die einzige noch funktionierende Bremse bei dieser Fahrt auf der schiefen Bahn." Czernin to Berchtold, September 19, 1914. *Ö.-U. Rotbuch*, No. 12. Cf. Czernin to Berchtold, October 9, 1914, *ibid.*, No. 20.

The following entry is given by Conrad v. Hötzendorf under the date September 19, 1914: "Rumänien. Einer Mitteilung des Vertreters des Ministeriums des Äussern Nr. 258 zufolge hatte König Carol auf den Vorschlag Bratianus, in die Bukowina einzumarschieren und die Russen 'hinauszuwerfen,' geantwortet: auf eine solche Proposition ginge er nicht ein, er hätte 'auch noch Ehre im Leib.' " Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 813. See also p. 768.

According to Schilling's telegram dated 24/11 Sept. 1914, the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd said after his return from Bucharest that for the time being the Rumanian government was not resolved to act against the will of the king. See *M.O.*, 6, p. 227, footnote 2.

for Rumania's active cooperation against Russia.<sup>44</sup> The scheme was said to have been also favored by the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and both Prime Ministers. Although Emperor Francis Joseph would have nothing to do with it since Rumania had not yet officially raised the question, he was reported probably not to have been disinclined to the idea once the suggestion was made.<sup>45</sup>

Referring to the deterioration of the state of affairs in Rumania, the Austro-Hungarian military attaché at Bucharest reported on September 15 that, in the opinion of Count Czernin, not only could the situation be saved but even Rumania's active interference on the side of the Central Powers would be possible if a part of Bukovina were ceded to Rumania and immediate and far-reaching concessions granted to the Rumanians of Transylvania. The Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest was said to have emphasized that he would no longer be able to vouch for the neutrality of Rumania if the suggested measures were not taken up.<sup>46</sup> Two days later, the Austro-Hungarian military attaché reported on his talk with the Rumanian Minister of the Interior who had told him that, if the Rumanians of Transylvania were given the same rights as those to which the Rumanians of Bukovina were entitled, a radical change of feeling in Rumania would still be possible; this was to be done

<sup>44</sup> The telegram is quoted in Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 724-725.

In case of Rumania's declaration of war on Russia, the Viennese government was willing to permit the entry of the Rumanian troops into Bukovina to cooperate with the Austro-Hungarian army; in other contingencies, however, the entry of the Rumanians into Bukovina and Transylvania was to be treated as an act of war. *Ibid.*, pp. 864 and 880.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 737.

<sup>46</sup> The Austro-Hungarian military attaché added: "Was heute noch erreichbar, ist wahrscheinlich in kurzer Zeit unmöglich."

After receiving the report, Conrad telegraphed Berchtold on the same day: "Erachte ein Arrangement mit Rumänien, welches dieses an die Seite der Monarchie bringt, mindestens aber von einer Aktion gegen letztere abhält, für ein dringendes Gebot der Klugheit, da, insolge wir allein den numerisch weit überlegenen russischen Kräften gegenüberstehen, auf einen durchschlagenden Waffenerfolg nicht zu rechnen ist." Conrad, *op. cit.* Vol. 4, p. 768.

quickly, however, for otherwise it would be too late.<sup>47</sup> Hereupon it was decided by the Supreme Command of the Austro-Hungarian army to send an aide-de-camp to the Hungarian Prime Minister in order urgently to recommend concessions to the Hungarian Rumanians.

In the meantime Germany stepped in advising her ally to seek to induce Rumania to active cooperation even at the price of satisfying the Rumanian demands within the Habsburg Monarchy and, if needed, by ceding the district of Suceava.<sup>48</sup> Finally, on September 19, 1914, Freiherr von dem Bussche called on the Rumanian king with the mission to promise concessions to the Rumanians in Transylvania and to offer rectifications of the border in Bukovina. King Charles, however, declined the proposal, referring to the internal situation in the country.<sup>49</sup>

As mentioned above, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs requested Poklevsky on September 17, 1914, to verify rumors that the Viennese government had allegedly promised to grant Transylvania autonomy if Rumania joined the Central Powers. The Russian envoy at Bucharest replied on September 22 that

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 790. See also p. 857.

<sup>48</sup> Stürgkh to Bolfras, September 19, 1914, Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 814.

<sup>49</sup> The king remarked in his diary: "Je réponds (to von dem Bussche) que l'opinion est impossible, qu'on veut entrer en Transylvanie, etc. . . . et que Bratiano serait abandonné." Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 819.

Another unsuccessful attempt was made by Germany somewhat earlier, in the first days of September 1914, when Emperor William II urged King Charles of Rumania by telegrams to join the Central Powers. *Ibid.*

When at the end of September an Austro-German offensive began in Poland, German military authorities pressed for a new effort to induce Rumania by most far-reaching concessions to active cooperation. Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 890. The suggestion was renewed by the Germans when Hindenburg's offensive between the Vistula and the Warta started in November 1914. It was asserted then that generous promises to Rumania and assurances of equal rights to the Rumanians in Hungary would presumably induce the Bucharest government to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. In order to achieve that aim, General Hindenburg urged territorial promises to Rumania. The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs was, however, of the opinion that not promises but military successes alone might bring Rumania to the side of the Central Powers. Conrad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, pp. 472-473 and 486-487.

members of the Rumanian government had not revealed any information about promises given by Austria-Hungary for Rumania's armed cooperation; it was known to him, however, from a "completely trustworthy source" that a special statute for Transylvania and insignificant rectification of the border in Bukovina had been recently promised by the Austrian government.<sup>50</sup>

While the Central Powers were inclined to grant constitutional concessions in Transylvania and territorial ones in Bukovina if Rumania entered the war on their side, the Russian government was not even willing to discuss the possibility of cession of a part of Bessarabia in return for Rumania's immediate participation in the war against the Habsburg Monarchy.

As early as September 1, 1914, the Russian envoy at Bucharest notified Sazonov that certain Rumanian statesmen as well as some organs of the Rumanian press gave it to be understood that they expected the cession by Russia of a part of Bessarabia in exchange for Rumania's neutrality.<sup>51</sup> A few days later, on September 7, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs transmitted to the ambassador of Great Britain at Petrograd a telegram from the British envoy at Bucharest, which was subsequently decoded at the Russian Foreign Ministry and in which it was reported that three indispensable conditions for Rumania's action against Austria-Hungary had been specified by the Rumanian Minister of Finance, one of them being the cession to Rumania by Russia of a part of Bessarabia.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 22/9 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 296.

<sup>51</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 1 Sept./19 Aug. 1914, *ibid.*, No. 204.

The Rumanian envoy at St. Petersburg intended originally to attempt to regain, in exchange for Rumania's commitment to preserve neutrality, that part of Bessarabia which had been ceded to Russia in 1878. After returning in August 1914 to Rumania, however, he found that "le grand courant de l'opinion publique roumaine s'était déjà, très ostensiblement, déclaré hostile à la coopération avec les Puissances centrales et cette attitude gênait fort le jeu des combinaisons diplomatiques." He concluded that "La carte de notre (i.e., Rumanian) neutralité, trop tôt jetée par nous, rendait la Russie moins accessible à toute négociation concernant la Bessarabie." Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 808.

<sup>52</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 224, footnote 2. It seems to be correct to assume that in the decoded telegram reference was made to Bessarabia.

On September 11, the Russian envoy in Greece informed his government of the mission of Diamandy and Istrati who were passing through Athens on their way to Italy. According to Demidov, these Rumanian politicians were allegedly authorized to ask the British ambassador in Rome for an intervention of the London cabinet in order to induce Russia to the cession of a part of Bessarabia; they were to give assurance that in that case Rumania would immediately enter into the war on the side of the Entente Powers.<sup>53</sup> Having received a copy of Demidov's telegram, the Tsar wrote on it on September 13: "Now we need the active participation of Rumania less than was the case at the beginning of the war."<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 259, footnote 1.

After several weeks the subject was actually broached by the British Prime Minister in a talk with the Russian ambassador at London. Emphasizing the importance of winning over Rumania, Asquith, according to Benckendorff's account, asked him whether the Russian government would consent to some slight rectifications of the border in Bessarabia in favor of Rumania after the war in which Rumania participated, and whether there existed any strategic arguments against it. At the same time the British Prime Minister stressed his increasing delight that in the solution of questions the Russian government was adopting the ethnological principle, the only principle considered by the British government to be a serious and lasting one. Finally, Asquith was reported to have remarked that such a splendid act of magnanimity would assure Russia in Europe a moral influence which was not to be underestimated. The Russian ambassador replied that as far as the strategic point of view was concerned, he was not able to express an opinion but that, in the case of which the British Prime Minister spoke, the ethnologic point of view was at the moment doubtful. Benckendorff was ready to admit that each act of magnanimity always bore fruit; he added, however, that in this particular case the point in question was not only a territorial decrease, always a very serious and difficult matter, but also a place with painful reminiscences of the Crimean War, and that he had, therefore, doubts whether Russian public opinion would assent to it. Thereupon Asquith was said not to have insisted on his suggestion but to have emphasized once more the importance of accession of Rumania and Italy to the alliance. The Russian ambassador concluded his report by remarking that the idea of a rectification of the border of Bessarabia was not new either in England or in France, and that with regard to that point the British government cherished a hope which would contribute extraordinarily to the strengthening of the future relations between Russia and Great Britain. Benckendorff to Sazonov, 30/17 October 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 430.

<sup>54</sup> The Tsar's remark in Russian. *M.O.*, 6, p. 259, footnote 1.



Somewhat later, on September 16, 1914, the Russian ambassador at Rome reported that on that day Diamandy and Istrati had paid him a visit. Allegedly with Bratianu's knowledge and the authorization of Take Ionescu, Filipescu, and the Rumanian Minister of Finance Costinescu, they asked Krupensky to urgently notify his government that if Russia consented to return to Rumania the Bessarabian districts incorporated in 1878, Rumania would immediately declare war on Austria and send all five corps against her. The Rumanians first referred to the principles of ethics and justice, and then argued that it would be impossible for their country to go along with Russia without restoring the old border because the insult made to allied Rumania by the detachment of the specified districts was still alive. The Russian concession would, in their opinion, force the Rumanian king to consent to a war with Austria-Hungary. If the Russian government preferred to give the requested promise not directly to the Bucharest cabinet but through the British and French cabinets, this would satisfy Rumania too. Such a decision would be reported immediately to the Rumanian parliament and all Rumania would enthusiastically become a Russian ally, according to the assurances of the Rumanian statesmen. Krupensky informed Petrograd that he had refrained from comment and asked for a speedy answer, adding that, if Rumania went with Russia, Italy could not remain neutral and would immediately act against the Dual Monarchy too. Nicholas II remarked, however, on the margin of Krupensky's telegram on September 19: "I am against the cession to Rumania of even a strip of Russian land."<sup>55</sup>

In the opinion of Serbian diplomats, Russia's unwillingness to even enter into negotiations on the question of Bessarabia contributed to the decision of the Rumanian government to remain neutral.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> "Ya protiv ustupki Rumynii khotya by klochka russkoi zemli." Krupensky's tel. and Tsar's comment in *M.O.*, 6, No. 266.

<sup>56</sup> The remark was made in a communication of the Serbian legation of 6. Oct./23 Sept. 1914. See *M.O.*, 6, p. 444, footnote 1.

#### IV.

While declining the Russian offer of an immediate Rumanian occupation of southern Bukovina and Transylvania, Bratianu was at the same time eager to obtain from Russia, France, and Great Britain a guarantee of Rumania's territorial integrity and a pledge that Rumania would be compensated with the Austro-Hungarian provinces, inhabited by the Rumanian population, in exchange for the maintenance of neutrality by the Bucharest government. The Rumanian Prime Minister was reported to have emphasized that such an agreement would by no means preclude the active cooperation of Rumania in the future.<sup>57</sup> On the other hand, Bratianu was said to have argued that violent manifestations for an immediate declaration of war on Austria-Hungary could lead only to such an internal upheaval in Rumania as would hardly be desirable or beneficial to the Russian government.<sup>58</sup>

The Russian envoy at Bucharest favored the idea of securing Rumania's neutrality by giving the Rumanian government certain definite promises, since this would prevent, in his opinion, any fluctuations on the part of the Rumanians if the fortunes of war were to become more advantageous for Russia's enemies. Poklevsky suggested that if the Russian government considered Bratianu's wishes too excessive, a distinction be made between cooperation and neutrality, and Transylvania alone be promised for a written pledge by the Rumanian government to maintain neutrality until the end of the war.<sup>59</sup> The Russian envoy at Bucharest did not share Sazonov's view that widespread publicity be given in Rumania to the Russian proposal requesting the Rumanian government to occupy at once southern Bukovina and Transylvania. Poklevsky reported

<sup>57</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 21/8 Sept. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 289.

<sup>58</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 26/13 Sept. 1914, *ibid.*, No. 319. Bratianu's view was shared by Poklevsky.

<sup>59</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, No. 289.

The French envoy at Bucharest was against compensations for Rumania's mere neutrality. *Ibid.*, Nos. 319, 324 and p. 323, footnote 2. In spite of Blondel's opposition, Poklevsky defended his point of view. *Ibid.*, No. 319.

to Petrograd that he had made more prominent Rumanian politicians confidentially acquainted with the Russian offer, but that he regarded it as undesirable to spread news about it.<sup>60</sup> In general it seemed to the Russian envoy at Bucharest advisable to act rather cautiously and to avoid anything which might have caused a split among the Rumanian parties. In Poklevsky's opinion the Rumanian king could be forced to change his policy only under the combined pressure of representatives of all the Rumanian political parties, which differed merely on the question when to act against the Habsburg Monarchy.<sup>61</sup>

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was, however, apparently displeased with Bratianu's negative reply to the Russian proposal of an immediate Rumanian occupation of southern Bukovina and Transylvania. After receiving the news from Poklevsky, he ordered the Russian envoy at Bucharest to make clear to Bratianu that the Russian government was not asking, especially after the defeat of the Austrian army, for Rumania's help but was merely requesting that it take what at the moment could be taken by Rumania without any effort. Therefore, Sazonov continued, nothing prevented Rumania from keeping a great part of her troops against Bulgaria; besides, a declaration of the three Entente Powers proposed by Russia would secure Rumania from a Bulgarian attack. Then the Russian Foreign Minister resorted to a threat. The three allied powers, he declared, had agreed that at the time of decision only those who participated in the common cause would have the right to a reward. Consequently, the wishes of the Rumanian Prime Minister appeared too exorbitant to Sazonov. In the opinion of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the most that could be given the Bucharest government for its written pledge to maintain neutrality till the end of the war was a corresponding promise of the three Entente powers acknowledging Rumania's right to the annexation of Transylvania, if no special military

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 277, footnote 2.

<sup>61</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 19/6 September 1914, *Tsar. R.*, p. 161, No. 36.

action on the part of the allies were required for the occupation of the province.<sup>62</sup>

In another telegram of the same day, Sazonov requested Poklevsky to take a step at Bucharest, conceived by the Russian Foreign Minister earlier but then postponed until Bratianu's refusal to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania became known at Petrograd. The Russian envoy at Bucharest was ordered to make a presentation to the Rumanian government regarding the transit of German war matériel through Rumania to Turkey.<sup>63</sup> At the same time Poklevsky was instructed to demand the Rumanian government's permission for a free passage of military supplies through Rumania to Serbia.<sup>64</sup>

While still on September 22, under the impression of unfavorable news from Bucharest, Sazonov threatened Rumania with losing the right to a reward after the war as a result of her neutrality policy, in the very next days thereafter he entered into negotiations over a Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement, thus abandoning his unsuccessful efforts to induce Rumania to seize at once southern Bukovina and Transylvania. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs did this, although both the French and the British governments were backing the Russian proposal of the Rumanian occupation of the territories mentioned, and in spite of a report of the Russian ambassador at London that Great Britain would not join Russia in promising Rumania Transylvania in return only for the country's

<sup>62</sup> Sazonov to Poklevsky, 22/9 Sept. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 291.

<sup>63</sup> Sazonov to Poklevsky, 22/9 Sept. 1914, *ibid.*, No. 293.

The diplomatic action on the subject was initiated by Sazonov on September 10; the British consent to a joint presentation at Bucharest was communicated to the Russian government on Sept. 13, 1914. See *M.O.*, 6, p. 286, footnote 2.

As a matter of fact, Poklevsky notified his government in a telegram dated Sept. 21, 1914, that he had made a corresponding declaration jointly with his French and British colleagues at Bucharest. *Ibid.*, p. 287, footnote 1.

<sup>64</sup> The Russian envoy at Bucharest was told to raise the question of the transit to Serbia with Bratianu, if needed, even single-handed. And, indeed, the British government hesitated to make to Rumania "from the point of view of international law two contradictory declarations." Benckendorff to Sazonov, 23/10 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 303.

neutrality.<sup>65</sup> Sazonov was undoubtedly influenced by conversations he held with Diamandy, the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd, who had just returned from Rumania.<sup>66</sup>

As early as September 23, the tone of a communication dispatched by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Bucharest differed markedly from that of telegrams sent by him to Poklevsky on the preceding day. It became apparent at a meeting with the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd, Sazonov telegraphed, that there existed the conviction in Bucharest that in consequence of Rumania's refusal to act immediately against Austria-Hungary Russia was no longer inclined to consent to the annexation of Transylvania and southern Bukovina by Rumania. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs assured Diamandy that this conviction was erroneous and that Russia agreed as before to these territorial increases. The complete disinterestedness displayed thereby by Russia, Sazonov argued, should open the eyes of the Rumanian government as to the sincerity of Russian friendship and Russia's desire to establish lasting neighborly relations with Rumania in the future, as well. The Russian envoy at Bucharest was instructed to talk with the Rumanian Foreign Minister in the same rather conciliatory spirit.<sup>67</sup>

On September 24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs called off the diplomatic action he himself had launched three days earlier. No longer expecting to induce the Rumanian government to an immediate open break with Austria-Hungary, he notified Paris and London of his wish to shelve the planned joint declaration of the three Entente Powers at Bucharest, de-

<sup>65</sup> See Grey to Buchanan, 22/9 Sept. (*M. O.*, 6, No. 294) and Benckendorff to Sazonov, 23/10 Sept. 1914 (*ibid.*, No. 301), respectively. Cf. also Benckendorff to Sazonov, 28/15 Sept. 1914 (*ibid.*, No. 329).

<sup>66</sup> Sazonov to Izvolsky, 17/4 October 1914, *Stieve*, No. 229. Also Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 810.

Sazonov mentioned a talk with Diamandy for the first time in a telegram dated 23/10 Sept. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 299. In a telegram dated 24/11 Sept. Schilling referred to Diamandy's return to Petrograd. *Ibid.*, p. 277, footnote 2.

<sup>67</sup> Sazonov to Poklevsky, 23/10 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 299.

signed to assure Rumania against a Bulgarian attack.<sup>68</sup> Sazonov realized that the Russian government had invited the Bucharest cabinet to enter southern Bukovina and Transylvania at an inopportune moment, when Rennenkampf's army had suffered defeat in East Prussia, and expressed the opinion that this factor probably contributed to the Rumanian refusal to accept the Russian proposal.<sup>69</sup>

The decision of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to secure at least Rumania's neutrality by promising Austro-Hungarian territories with a predominantly Rumanian population was made at the time when alarming news were arriving at Petrograd from Constantinople accompanied by disturbing reports about the situation in Sofia and Nish.

The dispatches from Constantinople spoke of the appearance of the cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" in the Black Sea.<sup>70</sup> Upon receiving the news, Sazonov considered the situation on September 23, 1914 so serious that he recommended the preparation, without loss of time, of an insurrection of the Armenians, Aissorians, and Kurds against the Turks, a rebellion which was to take place in the event of a Russo-Turkish war.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>68</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 282, footnote 3.

In the meantime the Russian ambassador in France reported in a telegram dated September 23, 1914, that Delcassé had approved Sazonov's draft of the declaration. *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> The view was given in Sazonov's telegram to Kudashev dated 25/12 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, p. 284, footnote 1.

Sazonov was informed about the military situation, and was told particularly that the Russian victory over the Austro-Hungarian army was not sufficiently utilized and that Rennenkampf suffered defeat, by a letter of the director of the Diplomatic Bureau at the Russian General Headquarters, Kudashev, dated 18/5 Sept. 1914, *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, Vol. 26, p. 5. Cf. Kudashev's letter to Sazonov dated 26/13 Sept. 1914, *ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>70</sup> In a telegram dated September 21, 1914, the Russian ambassador in Turkey reported that the "Goeben" had entered the Black Sea; on September 22 he informed Petrograd about the voyage of the "Breslau" there. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del. *Sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov: Peregovory ot 19 Iyulia do 19 Oktyabrya 1914 goda predshestvovavshie voine s Turtsiei*, Petrograd, Gosudarstvennaya tipografiya, 1914, Nos. 57 and 58, respectively. [Hereafter cited as *Sbornik*.]

<sup>71</sup> Klemm to Giers, 23/10 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 298.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was fully aware that the appearance of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" in the Black Sea might easily lead to incidents resulting in a war with the Ottoman Empire. As early as September 10, 1914, he had instructed the Russian ambassador at Constantinople to warn the Grand Vizier that the dispatch of the cruisers to the Black Sea might give rise to grave complications.<sup>72</sup>

The activity of the German Admiral Usedom, who arrived at Constantinople in the middle of September 1914 and soon thereafter became the General Inspector of the Coast Defense at the Dardanelles, was not reassuring either. On September 24 the Russian Foreign Ministry notified in an aide mémoire the British ambassador at Petrograd that the German admiral had inspected the Dardanelles and expressed himself in favor of the mining and closing of the Straits.<sup>73</sup>

Sazonov had even more reason to be concerned with these developments in view of reports reaching Petrograd during the preceding three weeks that a landing on the Black Sea coast and, in particular, a descent upon Odessa was contemplated.<sup>74</sup> The information based on secret sources and communicated by the Russian Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Naval Affairs on September 13, 1914, indicated that the Turkish fleet might sail out of the Bosphorus in order to cover a descent near Odessa or on the Black Sea shore of the Caucasus and that Germany pressed the Porte to land troops at Odessa and to advance from there towards Proskuriv.<sup>75</sup>

While on September 21 and 22 the Russian ambassador at Constantinople reported the appearance of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" in the Black Sea, on September 23 he informed his government of rumors spread by the German embassy that Genadiev, the former Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs who

<sup>72</sup> *Sbornik*, No. 49, and *M.O.*, 6, No. 255.

<sup>73</sup> *M.O.*, 6, p. 340, footnote 2.

<sup>74</sup> See Giers to Sazonov, 3 Sept./21 August (*Stieve*, No. 197), 10 Sept./28 Aug. (*Sbornik*, No. 47), and 24/11 Sept. 1914 (*M.O.*, 6, No. 309). Also Pallavicini to Berchtold, 2 Sept./20 Aug. 1914, *Tsar. R.*, p. 35, No. 64.

<sup>75</sup> *M.O.*, 6, p. 303, footnote 2.

had visited Turkey, was returning to Sofia accompanied by the Bulgarian envoy at the Porte, with a draft of the Bulgarian-Turkish agreement.<sup>76</sup> According to a communication dispatched by Giers one day later, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Constantinople telegraphed on September 15 that the necessity to compel Bulgaria to take a definite stand was, in the opinion of Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, the main preoccupation at the given moment.<sup>77</sup> On the following day the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was notified of the anxiety at Athens caused by reports that Bulgarian-Turkish joint actions were allegedly being prepared.<sup>78</sup>

Thus, the rumors about a Bulgarian-Turkish understanding and the preparation of joint Bulgarian-Turkish actions followed closely the news that the cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" had been sent to the Black Sea and, obviously, could not but add to the uneasiness at Petrograd. The possibility that Bulgaria might join Russia's adversaries had seriously to be taken into account, after the failure of intensive efforts made by Sazonov in August and early September 1914 to induce the governments of Nish and Athens, in return for the territorial expansion of Serbia and Greece at the expense of Austria-Hungary and Albania, to agree to territorial concessions acceptable to the cabinet of Sofia.

The situation in Serbia was at that time not encouraging either. The Serbian army lacked ammunition. Referring to the

<sup>76</sup> *Tsar. R.*, p. 41, No. 75.

On September 27, 1914, a report of the Russian military attaché at Sofia was transmitted to Sazonov in which Romanovsky adduced evidence supporting the rumors about a "complete accord" between Bulgaria and Turkey. *M.O.*, 6, No. 325.

<sup>77</sup> Giers to Sazonov, 24/11 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 309.

The Turks were repeatedly reported unwilling to enter the war against Russia without being assured as to Bulgaria's attitude. E.g., Giers to Sazonov, 9 Sept./27 Aug., 28/15 and 29/16 September 1914, *Tsar. R.*, p. 39, No. 72; p. 42, No. 80; p. 43, No. 82; p. 44, No. 83.

<sup>78</sup> Demidov to Sazonov, 25/12 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 314.

The possibility of common Bulgarian-Turkish actions was hinted at to Sazonov by Patev, the Bulgarian chargé d'affaires at Petrograd, on September 16, 1914, *ibid.*, No. 264.



urgent need of articles of war in Serbia, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed Poklevsky on September 22, 1914, to request the Rumanian government for permission to transit military supplies to the Serbs.<sup>79</sup> On the same day the Russian envoy at Sofia was authorized to make a similar request to the Bulgarian government.<sup>80</sup> The cabinets of Bucharest and Sofia, however, did not seem in a hurry to reply, and in the meantime the adverse news continued to arrive at Petrograd. On September 25 the Russian envoy at Athens reported that the shortage of artillery shells threatened to halt in a short time the military operations of the Serbian army; the Russian ambassador in France telegraphed that the French government would not be able for some time to deliver the needed shells to the Serbs.<sup>81</sup>

In view of all these developments Rumania's position assumed special importance. It was at this time that Sazonov became more susceptible to the idea of a Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement which was ardently espoused by the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd who had just returned from a trip to Rumania.<sup>82</sup> Realizing that for the time being the Rumanian government was hardly to be moved to a hostile action against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs gave up his efforts to induce the Bucharest cabinet to the immediate

<sup>79</sup> *M.O.*, 6, No. 293.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 344, footnote 1. Cf. Sazonov's suggestion of 8 September/26 August 1914, *Stieve*, No. 206.

<sup>81</sup> *M.O.*, 6, No. 314, and p. 310, footnote 1.

<sup>82</sup> Diamandy wrote on the subject:

"Je me rendais compte de l'importance que présentait pour la Roumanie un traité de neutralité conclu avec la Russie, garanti par la France et l'Angleterre et qui laissait mon pays libre quant au moment de son entrée en guerre; je savais également, par les instances de Jean Bratiano, combien il y tenait. Aussi mis-je toute mon ardeur à le mener à bien. N'eût-ce été qu'un point de vue professionnel, ce premier traité, négocié par moi, prenait à mes yeux un caractère passionnant.

J'entamai donc les pourparlers dès le lendemain de mon retour à Pétrograd, avec l'intention d'obtenir en échange de notre neutralité les mêmes conditions que la Russie eût voulu réserver uniquement à notre coopération militaire immédiate." Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 810.

occupation of southern Bukovina and Transylvania, and entered into negotiations over a Russo-Rumanian neutrality pact. Sazonov was ready now to compensate the Rumanians with territories of the Dual Monarchy for the maintenance of Rumania's neutrality alone. By such an agreement he expected not only to secure Rumania's benevolent neutrality, but also to oblige the Rumanian government to put an end to the transit between the Central Powers and Bulgaria and Turkey as well as to the deliveries of Rumanian products to Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the one hand, and to obtain the permission of the Bucharest cabinet for the passage of military supplies through Rumania to Serbia, on the other.<sup>83</sup>

## V.

The conversations between Sazonov and Diamandy soon brought about the first positive results.

On September 25, just a few days after Diamandy's return to Petrograd, the Rumanian envoy informed his government of a statement made by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in which Sazonov declared that Russia wished to have at her frontier a satisfied and friendly Rumania, and aimed at the stabilization of relations among the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy on the basis of the principle of nationality. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was said to have remarked that Rumania's military assistance was no longer necessary to Russia and that Rumania was called simply to occupy what was rightly to be hers, namely territories in Transylvania and Bukovina.<sup>84</sup>

The Rumanian Prime Minister was probably influenced by this telegram when on the next day he asked Poklevsky to convey his deep gratitude to Sazonov for the magnanimous appreciation displayed by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Rumanian national ideal and for future Russo-

<sup>83</sup> See the draft of an annex to the Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement of October 1, 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 341.

<sup>84</sup> Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 810.

Rumanian relations. Bratianu mentioned then the offer concerning Rumania's neutrality, but the Russian envoy emphasized anew as he had done two days earlier that what the Rumanian Prime Minister referred to was to be considered rather as Sazonov's personal opinion than as a formal offer. While reporting, however, his conversation with Bratianu to Petrograd, Poklevsky argued for negotiations with the Bucharest government on the basis of Rumania's neutrality.<sup>85</sup> The Russian envoy at Bucharest seemed as yet unaware of the rapid progress made in the negotiations between Sazonov and Diamandy.<sup>86</sup>

It was on September 26, precisely on the day when this conversation between Bratianu and the Russian envoy at Bucharest took place and when the latter dispatched his report about it to Petrograd, that Sazonov sent to Poklevsky the following draft of a Russo-Rumanian agreement worked out by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs jointly with Diamandy:

"Russia engages herself to recognize Rumania's right to annex the regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Rumanians. In Bukovina the principle of the majority of population will serve as a basis for the delimitation of territories to be annexed either by Russia or by Rumania. Rumania will be entitled to occupy these territories at a moment considered opportune by her.

In exchange Rumania engages herself to observe until the moment when this occupation will take place a benevolent neutrality toward Russia."<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 26/13 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 319.

<sup>86</sup> After remarking that the Russian legation at Bucharest was "plus exigeante dans ses demandes et moins large dans ses offres que le chef du Pont-aux-Chantres dans ses pourparlers avec moi, à Petrograd," Diamandy ascribed that attitude to "un excès de zèle" and asserted that the only aim of that policy was "d'empêcher le premier ministre roumain de calmer, par la perspective d'une neutralité fructueuse, les impatiences de l'opinion publique roumaine." Diamandy, *op. cit.*, pp. 810-811.

Actually, as the respective dispatches of the Russian legation at Bucharest to Sazonov reveal, Poklevsky supported Bratianu's point of view and persistently endeavored to win Sazonov over to the idea of a Russo-Rumanian understanding based on Rumania's neutrality.

<sup>87</sup> The original French text in *M.O.*, 6, No. 317.

The Russian envoy at Bucharest was instructed to submit the draft of the proposed agreement to Bratianu. It was suggested that, if approved by the Rumanian government, the agreement be signed at Petrograd by an exchange of notes between Sazonov and Diamandy.

The Imperial Russian government expressed thus explicitly its claim to the ethnically Ukrainian part of Bukovina.

The results of the negotiations at Petrograd must have been extremely welcome news to Bratianu who wished to report at a meeting of the Rumanian Crown Council to be held in the near future that it was possible to obtain compensations from the Russian government in return for Rumania's mere neutrality.<sup>88</sup> By pointing to a conspicuous achievement of his neutrality policy, the Rumanian Prime Minister, notwithstanding an anti-Austrian sentiment and a strong agitation in the country for a war with the Habsburg Monarchy, could convincingly argue that for the time being it was more advantageous to Rumania to remain neutral.

Bratianu immediately empowered the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd to proceed with the exchange of notes but at the same time attempted to induce the Russian government to additional commitments as well as to territorial concessions. The Rumanian Prime Minister asked specifically that Rumania's frontiers be guaranteed and proposed that the boundary between the Russian and the Rumanian parts of Bukovina be drawn along the river Prut because that line would, in his opinion, make a stable border between the two countries and would allegedly correspond to the ethnic division of the province.<sup>89</sup> Finally, Bratianu suggested that the agreement be kept secret until the time of its fulfillment.

<sup>88</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, No. 319.

At the meeting of the Rumanian Crown Council then planned, Rumania's neutrality was to be confirmed. Czernin to Berchtold, 28, 29, and 30 September 1914, *Ö.-U. Rotbuch*, Nos. 15, 16, and 17.

<sup>89</sup> Poklevsky to Sazonov, 28/15 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 330.

In fact, however, the line of the Prut would have left the greater part of the Ukrainian ethnic territory in Bukovina on the Rumanian side.

On September 29 Diamandy called on the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that he was authorized by the Rumanian government to sign the agreement. Yet at the last moment difficulties arose which almost caused the collapse of negotiations. At the Russian Foreign Ministry an annex to the note was worked out which, according to Sazonov's wish, was to be signed together with the main document. This supplementary note defined the Russian commitment to oppose any infringement of Rumania's territorial *status quo* as including a diplomatic but not a military action. On the other hand, it interpreted the "benevolent neutrality" to be observed by Rumania as including prohibition by the Bucharest government of any passage of military personnel through Rumania, as well as any export or transit of articles considered war contraband, to countries at war with Russia and her allies or to countries whose attitude in the conflict was still uncertain (i.e., to still neutral Bulgaria and Turkey); at the same time Rumania was, according to this interpretation of "benevolent neutrality," to grant all possible facilitation to the transit of war matériel and supplies from Russia to Serbia.

When Sazonov submitted to the Rumanian envoy the additional note, Diamandy flatly refused to sign what he called later "un véritable contrat de contrebandiers." The Rumanian envoy was reported to have been very much displeased and extremely excited because of this new Russian suggestion. Emphasizing in a talk with the director of the Chancellery of the Russian Foreign Ministry that Sazonov's proposal would make a most unfavorable impression at Bucharest and that it would be hardly acceptable to the Rumanian government, which consequently might be induced to give up the idea of an agreement with Russia altogether, Diamandy was said to have remarked that he himself would rather resign than sign such a document even if Bratianu were to approve it.

Eventually the deadlock was broken since both governments were interested in the conclusion of the agreement. The Rumanian Prime Minister was said to have been disturbed by the postponement of the planned exchange of notes at Petro-

grad. Pointing to the deterioration of the internal situation in Rumania, he pressed Diamandy to complete the negotiations. Sazonov also was anxious to bring the parleys to a successful end and decided, therefore, not to insist on the simultaneous signature of the proposed annex with the main note. The principal obstacle to the conclusion of the agreement was thus eliminated.<sup>90</sup>

In the meantime suggestions were made at the Russian General Headquarters that advantage be taken of the Russian military successes in the Carpathians in order to initiate new diplomatic actions. At first it was proposed that the Rumanians be informed of the advance of General Pavlov's troops into the then-Hungarian possessions and that Bucharest be urged anew to enter Transylvania.<sup>91</sup>

A few days later, in view of the rumors about a complete disorganization of the Hungarian units, which allegedly had escaped of their own will beyond the Carpathian Mountains in order to defend their country, another proposal was brought forward by General Yanushkevich. Guided by strategic considerations, he advanced the idea that an attempt be made to enter into an agreement with the Hungarian commanders. The Russians were to promise, according to the General's suggestion, not to advance into Hungary and the Hungarians were, in return, to withdraw their troops into the interior of the country in the direction of Transylvania. Since, however, such an understanding might have affected the negotiations with Rumania, Yanushkevich wanted to know the opinion of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the subject before entering into contact with the Hungarians.<sup>92</sup>

Sazonov strongly objected to the idea of negotiating an agreement with individual Hungarian commanders, persons without necessary authorization. He argued that, while not sufficiently securing Russia from the direction of Hungary, the

<sup>90</sup> The episode is described in the Russian Foreign Office diary (*M.O.*, 6, No. 353) and in Diamandy, *op. cit.*, pp. 811-812.

The original French text of the proposed *note annexe*, in *M.O.*, 6, No. 341.

<sup>91</sup> Kudashev to Sazonov, 28/15 Sept. 1914, *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, Vol. 26, p. 10.

<sup>92</sup> Kudashev to Sazonov, 1 October/18 Sept. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 344.

proposed understanding might, on the other hand, do much harm to the Russo-Rumanian agreement which was being negotiated with some difficulty, and would, in addition, limit Russia's freedom of action in relation to Hungary in the future when questions concerning the Slavic population of the Kingdom of Hungary (i.e., of Transcarpathia, Slovakia, Croatia, and Banat) would be resolved.<sup>93</sup>

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to General Yanushkevich on the very day of the conclusion of the Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement. It was on October 2, 1914, at 3 P.M., that the exchange of notes between Sazonov and Diamandy took place at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Petrograd.<sup>94</sup> Simultaneously it was decided that reservations of the Russian government regarding the interpretation of the Russian guarantee of Rumania's territorial integrity and regarding the interpretation of the "benevolent neutrality" to be observed by Rumania, would be communicated to Bratianu by Poklevsky.<sup>95</sup>

The Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement of October 1,

<sup>93</sup> Sazonov to Kudashev, 2 October/19. Sept. 1914, *ibid.*, No. 346.

<sup>94</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, No. 353, and Diamandy, *op. cit.*, p. 812.

The original French text of the notes which were dated October 1, 1914, in *M.O.*, 6, No. 340.

<sup>95</sup> On October 3 Poklevsky was instructed by Sazonov to make the corresponding statements to Bratianu. *Tsar. R.*, p. 167, No. 44. Before the Russian envoy at Bucharest succeeded in carrying out the mission entrusted to him, however, serious complications developed. See *M.O.*, 6, Nos. 366 and 371, and p. 381, footnote 4.

The Rumanian Prime Minister did not agree with the interpretation of Rumania's "benevolent neutrality" as defined in Poklevsky's written statement, and refused to accept the note of the Russian envoy. He even authorized the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd to declare that the Russo-Rumanian agreement would not be considered as accomplished if the Russian government insisted on the acceptance of Poklevsky's note. Finally, in accordance with a compromise solution which had been worked out at Petrograd, the interpretation of the nature of the Russian guarantee of Rumania's territorial *status quo* was communicated to Bratianu by Poklevsky in writing, and the Russian interpretation of Rumania's "benevolent neutrality" was explained by the Russian envoy at Bucharest orally. Poklevsky's statement was followed by the corresponding oral assurances of the Rumanian Prime Minister. See the Russian Foreign

1914, included text of the draft dispatched by Sazonov to Poklevsky on September 26 almost *in toto*, with only some minor changes in wording.<sup>96</sup> At the same time, it met most of Bratianu's wishes as communicated to Petrograd by Poklevsky on September 28.<sup>97</sup> Thus, according to the agreement concluded, the Russian government recognized Rumania's right "to annex the regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Rumanians" at a moment chosen by the Bucharest government which, in return, committed itself to observe until the day of the occupation of those territories a "benevolent neutrality" in relation to Russia. In addition, the Russian government obliged itself to oppose any violation of the *status quo* of the then-Rumania's territory, as desired by the Rumanian Prime Minister. Another of Bratianu's wishes was met by a provision to keep the understanding secret until the time of the annexation of the above-mentioned territories by Rumania.

Only on the question of the future Russo-Rumanian delimitation in Bukovina, the Rumanian Prime Minister had to give up his ambition with regard to the frontier along the river Prut. Both the draft sent by Sazonov to Poklevsky on September 26 and the final text of the agreement contained the following clause: "That which concerns Bukovina especially [in the draft of September 26: 'In Bukovina'] the principle of the majority of population will serve as a basis for the delimitation of territories to be annexed either by Russia or by Rumania." Moreover, the final text of the Russo-Rumanian neutrality

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Office diary, 14/1 October 1914, and Poklevsky to Sazonov, 17/4 October 1914, *M.O.*, 6, Nos. 389 and 394, respectively.

Yet the question of Rumania's "benevolent neutrality" remained a controversial problem. Cf. *M.O.*, 6, Nos. 402 with attached footnotes and 405. Dissatisfied with the policy of the Rumanian government, Sazonov was reported even to have been contemplating at one time the possibility of making a statement to the Bucharest cabinet that the three Entente Powers would retract their freedom of action concerning an eventual annexation of southern Bukovina and Transylvania by Rumania. Paléologue to Delcassé, 22 October 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 408.

<sup>96</sup> The text of this draft has been quoted above, p. 1620.

<sup>97</sup> See above, p. 1621.



agreement specified the procedure by which the future delimitation in Bukovina was to be brought about: "This delimitation [i.e., in Bukovina] will be effected on the ground of special studies on the spot. With this aim a mixed commission will be named provided with instructions which will be inspired by the spirit of conciliation that animates both Governments."<sup>98</sup>

The Russo-Rumanian understanding of October 1, 1914, also included the pledge of the Petrograd government to engage in securing the ratification of obligations of the agreement by the British and French cabinets. Accordingly, the Russian ambassadors at Paris and London were instructed on October 17 to inform the French and British governments of the Russo-Rumanian understanding and to express the hope that France and Great Britain would not refuse their consent to the future occupation of Transylvania and southern Bukovina by Rumania alone, without any help of the Entente Powers.<sup>99</sup>

The consent of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was reported immediately on the following day.<sup>100</sup> Delcassé concurred, although somewhat earlier the French envoy at Bucharest was reported to have been opposed to the idea of compensating Rumania in exchange for a mere commitment of the Rumanian government to maintain the country's neutrality.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>98</sup> The original French text of the quotation is as follows: "Pour ce qui a trait spécialement à la Bukovine [in the draft of September 26: 'Dans la Bukovine'] le principe de la majorité de la population servira de base à la délimitation des territoires à annexer soit par la Russie, soit par la Roumanie. Cette délimitation sera effectuée à la suite d'études spéciales sur les lieux. Une commission mixte sera nommée à cet effet, munie d'instructions qui s'inspireront de l'esprit de conciliation qui anime les deux gouvernements."

<sup>99</sup> *Stieve*, No. 229.

<sup>100</sup> See *M.O.*, 6, p. 361, footnote 1.

Two days later, on October 20, 1914, the Russian ambassador at London notified Sazonov of Nicolson's promise to inform Grey on the subject.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. footnote No. 59.

Also the French ambassador at Petrograd was critical of the Rumanian policy of Sazonov who "somewhat imprudently" agreed to confirm in writing the Russian pledges to Rumania. Paléologue to Delcassé, 22 October 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 408.

As far as Russia was concerned, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had even earlier assured the Russian ambassador that France, naturally, agreed in advance to the Russian territorial claims which were determined in general outline.<sup>102</sup>

The claims of the Imperial Russian government concerning Bukovina met with no opposition in London either. The projected delimitation on the ground of ethnic distribution of the population corresponded to the reported wishes of the British government to settle territorial questions in Europe after the end of the war according to the ethnographic principle, which was said to have been considered at that time by the London cabinet as the only effective basis for a lasting peace.<sup>103</sup>

As to the Rumanian claims, the British government already had declared in early August 1914 that it had no objection to the cession to Rumania of the Austro-Hungarian territories inhabited by the Rumanian population, as was proposed then by Russia in exchange for Rumania's active cooperation in the war against the Central Powers. At that time the London cabinet also expressed its willingness to support by diplomatic means the territorial integrity of Rumania.<sup>104</sup> When in the middle of September the Russian government requested the Bucharest cabinet to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania, the British Foreign Secretary authorized the British envoy at Bucharest to support his Russian colleague if asked to do so.<sup>105</sup> Several weeks later the Russian ambassador at London reported that the British government attached great importance to the participation of Rumania in the war on the side of the Entente Powers. The British Prime Minister even inquired whether the Russian government would assent to some frontier rectifications in Bessarabia in favor of Rumania

<sup>102</sup> Izvolsky to Sazonov, 13 Oct./30 Sept. 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 385.

<sup>103</sup> Benckendorff to Sazonov, 28/15 September and 30/17 October 1914, *ibid.*, Nos. 329 and 430.

<sup>104</sup> See chapter 1, p. 1591 ff.

The British government did not wish, however, to commit itself to participation in the annexation of the mentioned territories.

<sup>105</sup> Grey to Buchanan (Petrograd), September 22, 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 294.

if Bucharest joined the allies in the war against the Central Powers.<sup>106</sup>

When, however, Sazonov at one time suggested that the three great powers of the Entente should recognize Rumania's right to annex the Austro-Hungarian territories in return only for a written pledge of the Bucharest cabinet to preserve neutrality until the end of the war, the Russian ambassador at London expressed doubt as to whether in such case Great Britain would join Russia in assuming the proposed obligations.<sup>107</sup> A few days later Benckendorff again emphasized that the British government could be expected to support the Rumanian claims to the Austro-Hungarian territories provided Rumania took up arms on the side of the Entente.<sup>108</sup>

## VI.

Although the question of Bukovina became an object of international negotiations in the very first days after the outbreak of the general European war in 1914, the name of Bukovina was at first not mentioned in the diplomatic acts and correspondence. In the first phase of the negotiations between the Entente Powers and Rumania references were made to territories of Austria-Hungary inhabited by the Rumanians in general terms, without specifying those areas which included a part of Bukovina. One month later, however, the name Bukovina began to appear rather frequently in various diplomatic communications of that period.

In early August 1914 the Entente Powers offered Rumania, for Bucharest's active cooperation in the war against the Dual Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian lands with predominantly Rumanian population, including the ethnically Rumanian part of Bukovina. In the middle of September 1914, after a great part of Bukovina, with the capital of the province, had been conquered by the Imperial Russian army, the offer was renewed by the Petrograd government, which requested then that Rumania occupy immediately southern Bukovina and

<sup>106</sup> Cf. footnote No. 53.

<sup>107</sup> Benckendorff to Sazonov, 23/10 September 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 301.

<sup>108</sup> Benckendorff to Sazonov, 28/15 Sept. 1914, *ibid.*, No. 329.

Transylvania. Shortly thereafter, however, in the Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement of October 1, 1914, the Tsarist government agreed to recognize Rumania's right to annex the regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Rumanians in exchange only for Bucharest's benevolent neutrality during the war.

In the negotiations with Rumania, Petrograd advanced first implicitly and then explicitly its claim to the ethnically Ukrainian part of Bukovina since the Tsarist government considered Ukrainians (Little Russians in the official Russian terminology of that time) as but a part of the Russian people. The claim of the Petrograd government met with no opposition in Paris or London.

The question of the Russo-Rumanian delimitation in Bukovina was not raised until the middle of September 1914. In its communication of September 16, 1914, to the Bucharest cabinet the Imperial Russian government suggested that the future boundary in Bukovina be determined according to the ethnic distribution of the population. The principle of the ethnic majority of the population was recognized as a basis for the delimitation in Bukovina in the Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement of October 1, 1914, in spite of the suggestion of the Rumanian Prime Minister to draw the Russo-Rumanian border along the river Prut, a delimitation which would have resulted in leaving on the Rumanian side the greater part of the Ukrainian ethnic territory in Bukovina.

Bukovina was not only an object of negotiations between the Entente Powers and Rumania in the summer and autumn of 1914. As a consequence of an unfavorable military situation on the Russian front, the Central Powers were inclined in September 1914 to certain territorial concessions in Bukovina in favor of Rumania, contemplating especially to cede the district of Suceava as a price for Rumania's active cooperation in the war against Russia.

Bukovina thus became an important factor in the diplomatic struggle between the Central Powers and the Entente for Rumania's adherence to their respective causes.